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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the historical relationship between political parties and Australia’s 
permanent migration program. Whilst the existing empirical literature has often compared 
the decisions of specific, consecutive governments (for instance, the work comparing the 
Fraser, Hawke-Keating and Howard administrations) it has not yet viewed the parties 
themselves as central units of analysis. In practice, this means that it has not yet explicitly 
tested whether, over multiple administrations, the Labor and Liberal parties have supported 
distinct or coherent permanent intakes.  
This thesis explores this precise question. From 1972-2010, it examines whether Australia’s 
major parties have promoted programs of a different size or composition. Throughout this 
analysis, the paper recognises the influence of external factors in limiting and framing party 
autonomy. In particular, it acknowledges employment’s historical impact on migration 
decisions. Because of this, the thesis’ empirical analysis attempts to both acknowledge and 
control for the labour market. Ultimately, whilst not suggesting one single, overarching 
narrative about specific parties and migration outcomes, the paper emphasises the often 
distinct ways in which (because of both different responses to economic imperatives and 
different partisan motivations) Australia’s political parties have shaped the migration 
program’s size, composition and trajectory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Parties and Australia’s Migration Program Shaun Crowe 
 
4 | P a g e  
 
Contents 
 
Introduction p.5 
Chapter One: Context, History and Literature p.9 
Context p.9 
Historical Literature p.14 
Theoretical Literature p.19 
Chapter Two: Partisanship and Size, 1972-2010 p.26 
Parties and Size p.29 
Parties, Unemployment and Size p.33 
Transitionary Periods and Partisan Motivation p.39 
Chapter Three: Partisanship and Composition, 1984-2010 p.53 
Parties and Composition p.55 
Parties, Unemployment and Composition p.59 
Transitionary Periods and Partisan Motivations p.63 
Conclusion p.70 
Bibliography p.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Parties and Australia’s Migration Program Shaun Crowe 
 
5 | P a g e  
 
Introduction 
When viewed from a certain angle, the history of modern Australia has been a history of 
permanent migration. From British colonisation and settlement, to Gold Rush-inspired 
arrivals, to the nation’s post-War expansion, Australia’s population has been fundamentally 
shaped and augmented by immigrants (Caldwell, 1987, pp.23-26; Markus and Semyonov, 
2010, pp.8-9). Indeed, even amidst the ‘White Australia Policy’ (whereby the criteria for 
entry was restrictionist in its racialism [Jupp, 2002, p.7-9]) the country’s size and 
demographics were still heavily influenced by people entering Australia on a permanent 
basis (Kippen and McDonald, 2000, p.14).   
In a more contemporary setting, this has also been somewhat of a political question. 
Implicitly and explicitly, members of both major parties have discussed the migration 
program as if their partisan agendas have guided policy. Malcolm Fraser claims to have 
expanded the program he inherited from Gough Whitlam (Fraser, 2011, p.421); Bob Hawke 
publically professed a preference for high migration levels (Ahluwahlia et al, 2009, p.23; 
Alsop, 2008, p.23); senior members of the Howard government, despite their reputation for 
being ‘tough’ on certain modes of immigration, have asserted that they ‘rehabilitated’ 
support for large migrant targets (McNamara, 2009, p.230; Daily Telegraph, 2010). Even in 
the country’s most recent election, both parties engaged with the migration program’s size: 
in the process of campaigning, both Julia Gillard and Tony Abbott argued that their partisan 
decisions would shape a more ‘sustainable’ population future (SMH, 2010a; Tony Abbott 
MP, 2010).  
 
This thesis wants to scrutinise the historical relationship between partisanship and the 
migration program: it wants to test whether, between Australia’s two major parties, there 
has been a substantive difference in policy. Whilst the existing scholarship has frequently 
compared specific, consecutive governments (for instance, the work comparing the relative 
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approaches of the Fraser, Hawke-Keating and Howard administrations [Patience, 1989; 
Betts, 2003]) it has not yet united and analysed multiple governments under the one ‘party’ 
umbrella. Because of this, it has not yet tested whether the Labor and Liberal parties have 
possessed longer-term, distinct or coherent policy preferences (see: Chapter One). This 
paper will examine this precise topic. Across the nation’s post-White Australia history, it will 
analyse whether there has been an observable difference in the Labor and Liberal parties’ 
approaches to the migration program.  
Within this broad conceptual question, the thesis will ask two specific sub-questions. This is 
because there is the potential for partisan variation in both the program’s ‘size’ and 
‘composition’. Firstly, ‘size’ is referring to the total number of people allowed entry under 
Australia’s migration program. In a direct numerical sense, this is concerned with whether 
either party has promoted higher (or lower) permanent intakes. Secondly, within this 
measurement of size, there is also the question of who exactly comprises the program. This 
means asking whether either party has disproportionately supported a certain type of 
immigrant: in essence, whether there has been a partisan distinction in the balance between 
skilled and family reunion migrants. Ultimately, applying its broad question to these two 
sub-questions, the thesis will ask whether there has been a partisan cleavage in either the 
‘size’ or ‘composition’ of Australia’s migration program. 
 
However, before this is commenced, the paper should first acknowledge its scope: it should 
make clear what it will and will not be examining. The thesis will be searching for inter-
party distinction in Australia’s ‘migration program’. When discussing the nation’s ‘migration 
program’, we are referring to visas issued in Australia for permanent residence. Whilst later 
chapters will expand upon this in greater detail, this program officially comprises three 
‘streams’: it contains ‘skilled’, ‘family reunion’ and ‘special eligibility’ migrants (DoPS, 2010a, 
p.1). It does not, however, include humanitarian or temporary arrivals. Whilst, to different 
degrees, these both represent politically significant areas of partisan contention (especially 
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the humanitarian program and the processing of asylum seekers [see: MacCallum, 2002; 
Manne, 2004; Crock et al, 2006]) the paper will, as much as possible1, treat them as discrete 
areas of public policy. This is partly to keep the thesis’ topic manageable and partly to avoid 
re-articulating well established debates. But, more than this, it is also to avoid conflating 
issues with potentially unique intellectual and political imperatives. Whilst not discounting 
the possibility of philosophical and electoral overlap, a party’s approach to permanent 
migration does not necessitate a certain approach to accepting (and, more importantly in 
the partisan debate, processing) asylum seekers. Because of these reasons, we must make 
clear that, rather than discussing all modes of immigration, the paper is solely engaging with 
permanent arrivals and Australia’s ‘migration program’.   
Secondly, the paper has temporal parameters. As will be explained in the relevant chapters, 
because of both conceptual and data-based considerations, the thesis will cover fixed time 
periods. Chapter Two, which examines the question of size, will study party policy in the 
post-White Australia era, from 1972-2010; Chapter Three, which applies the same logic to 
the program’s composition, will examine partisanship from 1984-2010. These different 
time-frames are largely due to the different amounts of available evidence in the two sub-
questions (DoPS, 2010b, p.10, and p.13). However, despite these temporal restrictions, both 
periods still represent relatively substantial lengths of time; moreover, they are lengths of 
time in which the two major parties have enjoyed roughly similar lengths of governance. As 
a consequence, they both offer an opportunity to examine the existence of inter-party 
distinction and to broadly answer the paper’s question. 
 
                                                          
1 At certain points, the policy areas do intersect. For instance, in 2008-09, a third of permanent visas were 
issued for onshore migrants that had originally entered Australia under the temporary program (DIAC, 
2009, p.30). However, even if the applicants began as temporary arrivals, they were still, like those coming 
from offshore, only counted as permanent when they became permanent visa holders: that is, even if there 
as some transition between temporary arrivals and the longer-term permanent intake, it was already 
accounted for in the ‘migration program’ figures (DIAC, 2009, p.30). This means that, whilst there is some 
relationship between the policy areas, the migration program sufficiently controls for that to the extent to 
which permanent migration statistics can be read as relatively discrete.  
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Structurally, the thesis has three chapters. Chapter One will provide a background for the 
paper’s original analysis. Using the 2010 election as a case study, it will highlight the 
ostensible interaction between parties and the migration program. By doing this, it will 
attempt to prove that the paper’s question (about the existence of an historical partisan 
difference) is of academic and practical significance. Following this, it will illustrate the 
empirical and theoretical literature which has previously engaged with the topic. Chapter 
Two will apply the paper’s broad question to the issue of size. This will involve three sub-
sections and attempt to go beyond a blunt, variable-free analytical method: in other words, 
it will acknowledge the external environment that frames party decisions and attempt to 
control for it. Chapter Three will apply a similar logic as Chapter Two, but this time to the 
topic of composition. Like the analysis of size, it will control for the external climate and 
examine whether, between the Labor and Liberal parties, there has been a difference in the 
compositional balance of migrants granted permanent entry. Ultimately, through these 
three chapters, the thesis will question whether the nation’s partisan clash (in many ways, 
the public face of Australian democracy) has also represented divergent approaches to its 
migration program.  
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Chapter I 
The History of Party Politics and Australia’s Migration Program: 
Context and Literature  
 
In order to provide the necessary background for the thesis’ empirical research, this chapter 
will do two main things. Firstly, it will contextualise the paper’s research topic. Using 2010’s 
federal election as a case study, it will illustrate how, in a recent period of inter-party 
competition, the major parties have publically engaged with the migration program. As a 
consequence, it will attempt to prove that, rather than originating in a vacuum, the question 
is of practical and academic concern. Secondly, it will highlight the literature that has 
previously examined the topic. This encompasses both the existing empirical and theoretical 
work: work which has examined how the major parties have historically approached the 
migration program and also why they could be motivated to behave in distinct ways. 
Ultimately, Chapter One will ask: why is the topic important and who has previously asked a 
similar question? 
 
1.1 Context: the 2010 Election, Migration Policy and the Rhetoric of Difference 
This thesis is only of interest insofar as partisanship relates to Australia’s migration 
program. Indeed, if the institutions and policies were completely unrelated, the piece would 
be a rather long exercise in redundancy. Thus, before going on to analyse the question 
empirically, we should first make some of this context clear: to show how, in the process of 
inter-party competition, the former has engaged with the latter. If we use 2010’s federal 
election as a case study, this overlap can be observed in at least three main ways: the parties’ 
rhetorical attempts to create distinction, the popular perception of partisan distinction and 
the program’s influence on other policy areas of potential partisan distinction. Thus, by 
looking at the country’s most recent election (and drawing attention to its ostensible 
interaction between partisan actors and the migration program) this section will attempt to 
prove that the paper’s central question is worthy of our attention.  
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Firstly, the relationship between parties and the migration program has been visible in the 
rhetoric of politicians. In Australia’s most recent election, representatives from both major 
parties sought to articulate normative stances on the migration program. Indeed, according 
to Williams, these issues came to ‘dominate’ the campaign’s second week (2011, p.320). We 
witnessed both Julia Gillard and Tony Abbott, as respective leaders of the Labor and Liberal 
parties, using the ‘size’ of the program as a party-political tool. On the Right, Abbott 
announced that, if elected, he would cut the annual migrant intake to 170,000, down from its 
earlier peak under Rudd (SMH, 2010b). He stated that many Australians thought that 
immigration was ‘out of control’ and that he would, in response to their concerns, seek to 
make the program more ‘sustainable’ (Reuters, 2010). And whilst the statistical basis of 
these claims was criticised as both dubious and disingenuous (Treasury projections 
confirmed that the country was already headed toward that figure [Williams, 2011, p.320]), 
the Liberal Party’s arguments remain illuminating for this paper. The party, if not entirely 
veracious, was still attempting to create the perception that partisan differences would 
dictate policy: it was implying to the electorate that, if elected, it would act in a substantively 
different fashion to Labor.   
Under Julia Gillard, the Labor Party also sought to construct an image of prudence. Upon her 
ascension to the party’s leadership, she explicitly stated that, rather than allowing the 
country to ‘hurtle’ towards a population of 36 million or 40 million, she supported a 
‘sustainable Australia’ (SMH, 2010a). And whilst this was ostensibly a statement on 
population policy, it was unavoidably linked to the size of Australia’s migration program 
(Murray, 2010, pp.6-7). Because population growth is a product of natural growth (the 
difference between births and deaths) and migratory growth (the difference between 
immigration and emigration), a ‘sustainable’ policy would inevitably involve some form of 
revision of the migration program (Hugo et al, 2010, p.21). Partly because of its refusal to 
explicitly link these statements to immigration (or, for that matter, fertility), Labor’s policy 
was criticised for not expanding on how ‘sustainability’ would be achieved (Brisbane Times, 
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2010). Indeed, apart from announcing a cabinet portfolio for ‘Sustainability’, the party’s 
commitment to a more cautious population policy was promoted with relatively little detail: 
it presented a vague goal, rather than a strategy of how it could be reached. But like with the 
Liberal Party, even if Labor’s comments were verging on vacuity, they still provide useful 
context. By engaging in both direct and indirect debates over Australia’s migration future (in 
a sense, a rhetorical ‘race to the bottom’), politicians from both parties were suggesting to 
the public that partisan factors would drive policy (Aulich, 2010, p.11). This paper wants 
scrutinise the implications of such discourse: it wants to ask whether, at the historical nexus 
between parties and public policy, this partisan dynamic has actually exerted a meaningful 
influence over the migration program.  
 
Secondly, if the relationship between parties and migration policy is important insofar as 
leaders have attempted to construct the perception of difference, so too is the way that the 
public has received such rhetoric: in other words, the extent to which Australians believe 
this partisan distinction to be true. If we examine recent public polling, there is evidence 
which suggests that many Australians do perceive some form of inter-party division. Amidst 
2010’s electoral dispute, Essential Polling asked Australians who they ‘trusted most to 
handle the immigration issue’. Explicitly worded2 to reference the program’s size, as 
opposed to the equally sensitive asylum seeker question, 35% indicated faith in the 
Coalition, 23% preferred Labor, and 31% perceived ‘no difference’ (Essential Media, 2010a). 
Whilst it is difficult to draw obvious partisan lessons from such a poll, one implicit point 
seems relatively clear: for a sizeable portion of the community (in this poll, over half of it) 
there exists the perception that partisan differences influence migration outcomes. By 
‘trusting’ one major party more than the other, respondents to Essential’s poll presented the 
implicit belief that the major parties would behave differently. If politicians had attempted 
                                                          
2 The question was prefaced with the statement that: ‘Tony Abbott has proposed to cut immigration from 
around 300,000 a year to 170,000’ (Essential Media, 2010a).  
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to rhetorically construct distinction, their success was tacitly reflected in the popularity of 
these partisan notions of ‘trust’.  
Furthermore, in terms of actual policy preferences, the polling registered a solid difference 
along party-lines. The sample was asked: ‘Tony Abbott has proposed to cut immigration 
from around 300,000 a year to 170,000. Do you approve or disapprove of this cut to 
immigration?’ In response, 91% of Liberal-National voters approved, whilst decidedly less 
Labor voters, at 52%, agreed with the proposition (Essential Media, 2010a). Whilst, again, 
we should acknowledge the poll’s limitations (the question referred explicitly to 
partisanship, so we cannot be overly surprised that it came to a partisan conclusion), we 
should also recognise its implications. At least during the 2010 election, Coalition voters 
were more likely to advocate a smaller migration program than those supporting Labor. 
Like the aforementioned political rhetoric, this thesis wants to interrogate the relationship 
between popular sentiment and policy substance: it wants to test whether this perception of 
difference has been matched by historically partisan policy decisions and whether this 
disaggregation of voter preferences has been reflected in the major parties’ traditional 
behaviour. Ultimately, is this ‘trust’ grounded in historical reality? 
 
Finally, looking again at the 2010 election, the paper is significant because the migration 
program has influenced other policy areas of potential partisanship: in other words, it has 
overlapped with policies that also feature open inter-party debate. The most obvious of 
these, and one to which was previously alluded, is ‘population’ policy. As stated, because 
populations grow and recede by natural change (the difference between births and deaths) 
and migratory change (the excess of incoming migrants over outgoing migrants), ‘size of 
country’ debates are inevitably linked to migration policy. In fact, as Graeme Hugo’s recent 
‘Demographic Change and Liveability Panel Report’ argued, when compared with the 
relative stability of natural increases over recent decades, ‘there has been considerable 
volatility in net migration, reflecting its greater susceptibility to being influenced by 
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economic trends and policy intervention’ (2010, pp.22-23). This ‘greater susceptibility to 
intervention’ (in other words, active changes to the nation’s intake) has meant that, when 
the major parties normatively debate population, they are at least partially debating 
migration policy. Because of their overlap, it is almost impossible to divorce a discussion of 
the former from the latter.  
Looking at the 2010 federal election, representatives from both the Liberal and Labor 
parties implied that their partisan agendas would substantively influence Australia’s 
population strategy. For instance, on the Right, Tony Abbott promised to ‘cap’ the populace 
at 29 million (Herald Sun, 2010). Whilst this exact number experienced some revision and 
obfuscation, the Liberal Party did consistently commit to ‘reducing Australia’s annual rate of 
population growth’ (Tony Abbott MP, 2010). Abbott even explicitly linked the party’s 
population policy to migration: he argued that ‘a fair dinkum debate about population 
cannot avoid immigration, because that’s what’s driving the increase’ (Daily Telegraph, 
2010b). Similarly, Labor also insinuated that its conscious choices would influence 
Australia’s policy. As alluded to earlier, without going into specifics, Gillard promised that 
she would not oversee a ‘big Australia’, instead preferring to focus on ‘sustainability’ (Hundt, 
2011, p.281). Again, at this stage, the veracity of such rhetoric is not necessarily important: 
what is important, and what contextualises the thesis, is that both parties have told the 
electorate that their active, often partisan decisions would shape the nation’s population 
policy. And with population being another area of ostensible partisan division (in 2010, 
more voters thought it was ‘highly important’ than did ‘global warming’ [ANU, 2010])3, the 
paper’s question carries another layer of significance. Because of population’s ineluctable 
relationship with migration, partisan engagement with the former’s size implies indirect 
partisan engagement with the latter: if we want to understand the first historical 
relationship, we have to also understand the second.  
                                                          
3 Before the election, Essential Media found that 36% of voters thought that ‘population policy’ was ‘highly 
important’, whilst only 30% thought the same about ‘global warming’ (ANU, 2010).  
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These points are not necessarily suggesting that open partisanship has been a feature of 
every federal election. What they are suggesting is that the migration program has been 
treated as a partisan issue and that we should, as political scientists, seek to scrutinise the 
implications of such rhetoric. The ostensible interaction between parties and permanent 
migration (in 2010, being evident in politicians’ statements, public perception and related 
areas of partisan policy) warrants systematic analysis. This is what this paper wants to do: it 
wants to test whether, historically, there has been a meaningful difference in the actual 
behaviour of the Labor and Liberal parties. However, before the paper commences this 
empirical analysis, it should first acknowledge the existing literature that has (both directly 
and indirectly) already engaged with the question.    
 
1.2. Australia’s Empirical Literature: Parties and the History of the Migration Program 
Empirically, the Australian literature has not yet attempted to find a coherent, overarching 
relationship between specific major parties and permanent migration: it has not sought to 
explicitly test whether, over an extended period of history, the Labor and Liberal parties 
have preferred programs of a certain size or composition. This is largely because, rather 
than viewing parties as single units of analysis (insofar as they tend not to conflate multiple 
administrations, such as Fraser and Howard, under the one ‘Liberal’ umbrella), previous 
work has largely focussed on specific, transitionary periods of governance (see: Price, 1979; 
Patience 1989; Betts, 2003). This research has often asked similar questions to this paper 
(about whether different governments, representing different parties, have promoted 
distinct migration policies), but has not yet searched along party-lines for longer-term 
patterns. This is the precise hole that this paper seeks to fill. However, even if these existing, 
transitionary sources have not attempted to uncover broader inter-party tendencies, they 
are still helpful for this thesis: they provide a foundation for understanding how the Labor 
and Liberal parties have interacted with the program and, when viewed together, also allude 
to certain trends and hypotheses for the paper’s own original analysis. 
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When studying the first transition after White Australia’s abolition (that is, from Whitlam to 
Fraser) various commentators have observed a relationship between the program’s size and 
the party in office. For instance, whilst acknowledging continuity in the dismantling of racial 
selectivity, Charles Price has argued that the Fraser government promoted a comparatively 
expansionist program. Finding a meaningful difference in both philosophy and policy, he 
asserted that the Liberal Party’s migration targets were consciously and substantively 
higher than their predecessor’s (Price, 1979, p.212-213). This was also echoed by Birrell 
and Freeman, who argued that, as the parties changed, so too did the mentality of the 
Australian state: after the Liberal Party’s election, the migration program was ‘restored as 
an important national priority’ (Freeman and Birrell 2001, p.532). Indeed, this general 
conclusion has received broad academic support, with numerous sources asserting that the 
Liberal government’s policy decisions actively drove a larger migrant intake (Tavan, 2005, 
p.427; Allsop, 2008, p.22). Thus, at least during the period’s first partisan transition, the 
existing empirical research has implied a link between different parties and different 
policies: according to the bulk of scholarship, the Fraser government endorsed a more 
expansive migration program than Whitlam’s Labor Party. 
 
Focussing on the following election, there is similar literature analysing the nexus between 
Fraser and Hawke. Some of it, like Allan Patience’s work, begins to form the basis of a 
potential cross-party trend. Patience has argued that, once elected, the Hawke government 
acted to reduce the country’s overall quota for immigrants. Moreover, these reductions 
coincided with a realignment of the program’s composition: the percentage of family 
reunion visas increased, whilst skilled permits registered a decline (Patience, 1989, p.419-
420). In short, where Fraser’s Liberal Party sought to expand the program it inherited from 
Whitlam, the Hawke government moved initially in the opposite direction. As a caveat, 
Patience acknowledged that these decisions were made in the context of rising 
unemployment, adding another, non-party, cause of change (1989, p.420). However, despite 
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the qualifier, Patience’s analysis did assert that partisan differences were an important 
factor in changing policy. From Fraser to Hawke, he argued, politicians made conscious 
decisions to both reduce the program’s overall size and alter its composition.  
However, if we examine the literature that has taken a longer-term perspective, then these 
conclusions have been tentatively refuted. James Jupp has argued that, following the initial 
revision discussed by Patience, the migration program ‘built up steadily’ to a peak in 1990. 
In fact, because of both its numerous ministers and the period’s economic context, the 
government’s policy was actually quite difficult to ‘distinguish’ (Jupp, 2002, p.47). This 
argument was also mirrored by Collins, who has emphasised this gradual rise in intake, 
pointing to the problems associated with clearly classifying the Hawke-Keating 
administration’s policy position (1995, p.2). Indeed, this period’s literature highlights the 
difficulty of categorising consecutive governments in clear binaries (that is, whether they 
preferred large or small, skilled or family reunion intakes), especially without considering 
the economy’s influence. Accordingly, and as will be later explained in greater detail, the 
paper’s empirical analysis will both acknowledge and attempt to control for this economic 
variable. As Patience, Jupp and Collins have all implied, the decisions surrounding migration 
policy cannot be read in an economic vacuum. Moreover, this literature also suggests that, to 
truly understand the relationship between parties and the program, it is necessary to go 
beyond looking at immediately transitionary years. Whilst they represent one useful 
methodological tool, partisan cleavages could also result from later-term, rather than initial, 
policy decisions.  
 
The literature comparing Hawke-Keating to Howard also engages with both the intake’s 
composition and size. In terms of the former, as with Patience’s post-Fraser analysis, certain 
researchers have asserted that the transfer of executive power dictated a shift in who 
comprised the program: that is, that it changed the existing balance between skilled and 
family reunion migrants. Betts, for instance, has argued that the Howard government 
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‘sharpened the program’s economic focus and reduced the size of its family-reunion 
component’, disproportionately promoting the skilled stream (2003, p.169). This conclusion 
has been reinforced by other scholars, who have also asserted that Howard’s program was 
founded on a more explicitly economic rationale than Labor’s was (Higley et al, 2011, p.3; 
Collins, 2008, p.254). When viewed alongside the Fraser-Hawke literature, these sources 
point to a potential inter-party trend and, for the paper’s later empirical analysis, a possible 
hypothesis to test: looking purely at these two transitionary periods, the existing literature 
implies a link between Liberal governance and a preference for skilled migration. 
On top of changing the compositional balance, much of the era’s research also argues that 
Howard expanded the program’s overall size, increasing the sheer number of people 
entering the country with permanent visas. Embodied in the work of Higley, this scholarship 
has argued that, ‘during the Howard government’s long life’ ... [the program’s] aggregate 
intakes rose’ (2011, p.3; Betts, 2010, p.49). To some observers, these arguments (asserting a 
gradual growth in permanent migration) might seem curious, especially in the context of 
John Howard’s popular reputation for being ‘tough’ on certain modes of immigration 
(McNamara, 2009, p.230). Indeed, the period’s literature shows why we must be mindful to 
disaggregate the relevant from both the superfluous and superficial: why we must separate 
the empirical reality of the ‘migration program’ from other discrete policy areas and also 
from the popular myths surrounding parties and governments. However, beyond these 
observations, this literature does somewhat conform to the earlier, potential transitionary 
patterns. Like with the Whitlam-Fraser and Fraser-Hawke periods, politicians representing 
the Liberal Party did, according to much of the relevant literature, initially act to promote 
both higher and more skills-focussed intakes. Although, as previously implied, such 
literature should be read with a degree of caution and informed scepticism, in that some of it 
does not engage explicitly with the influence that economic context has played in migratory 
decisions (see: Betts, 2003).  
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However, insofar as these trends in the literature exist, they do not conform to the work 
which has examined Australia’s most recent administration. Instead, the early research 
concerning the Rudd-Gillard Labor government points to an aberration. If the contours of 
the aforementioned literature have hinted at certain inter-party trends (that is, that the 
Liberal Party has promoted both higher and more skills-focused intakes), they are largely 
refuted by the work which analyses Australia’s most recent transition. Birrell and Healey, 
for instance, have argued that, since Rudd came to power in 2007, the government has 
‘pursued a record-high migration policy’ (2010, p.39; Betts, 2010, p.49). Stutchbury has 
made a similar assertion, arguing that the government has overseen ‘the nation’s most rapid 
immigration expansion since the 1960s’ (2011, p.46). Moreover, these intakes have 
maintained the program’s economic focus: according to Birrell and Healy, they have 
‘privileged the delivery of migrant skills over all other factors in setting immigration policy’ 
(2010, p.40). Whilst the history of this particular government is still being written, the 
burgeoning literature does imply that, contrary to the material on other transitions, the 
Labor Party has actually expanded the program’s size and its proportion of skilled migrants. 
Ultimately, because of this, any attempt to bluntly unite the disparate literature into one 
explanatory theory (in terms of the major parties’ distinct policy preferences) will find it 
difficult to adequately account for such a seemingly anomalous administration, especially if 
it refuses to acknowledge and incorporate further variables into its analysis.    
Therefore, for this paper’s precise question, the existing Australian literature provides some 
important allusions, without ever presenting a clear and explicit answer. This is primarily 
because it has tended to examine the relationship between specific governments and the 
migration program, rather than searching further for partisan patterns. As a start, though, it 
does offer both significant lessons and potential hypotheses. Firstly, because governments 
face different economic climates (which, as will later be expanded upon, carry different 
migratory imperatives), it suggests that we should not simplistically compare them without 
acknowledging the influence of context (Jupp, 2002, p.47). Secondly, it suggests that, in 
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order to gain a more holistic and accurate picture of party behaviour, we should not rely 
solely on examining the narrow transitionary years of governance (Collins, 1995, p.2). 
Beyond these two observations, when pieced together, this historical literature also hints at 
certain testable theories. Whilst not reflected unanimously, much of the work implies that 
the Liberal Party might prefer both larger and more skills-focussed intakes. Ultimately, in its 
own empirical analysis, this thesis will both heed these lessons and scrutinise these 
hypotheses.  
 
1.3. Theories of Distinction: Why Would Parties Behave Differently? 
If the aforementioned historical research has not yet asserted an overarching relationship 
between parties and the migration program, there is still a body of theoretical literature 
which argues why they could possess distinct and coherent policy preferences. Often 
designed for different national settings, but largely applicable to Australia’s political context, 
these theories examine the structural reasons behind any cross-party cleavage. Whilst 
certain arguments are contradictory (in that some assert that Labor benefits from higher 
intakes, whilst others argue the opposite) they are all trying to explain how parties 
themselves could be meaningful causal agents. These theories are necessary for the thesis’ 
later analysis, insofar as they provide a conceptual framework for understanding its 
empirical results: by analysing ‘motivation’, they present reasons as to why the parties could 
have shaped the program in certain, and potentially different, ways. These theories can be 
separated into those relating to ‘constituents’ and those relating to ‘ideology’. 
The first of the theories concerns the electoral impact of future residents.  This examines the 
way that newly-arrived Australians, as a voting bloc, influence the major parties’ political 
capital. This is the idea that, because migration decisions affect a potential electoral group, 
the major parties could face unique political incentives. As Breunig and Luedtke suggest, 
parties of the Left could view immigrants as a potentially favourable constituency and, from 
a rational, vote-maximising perspective, be more likely to perceive electoral gains from a 
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larger intake (2008, p.128). Because, on top of the principles uniting economic policy, Left-
wing parties tend to support certain progressive ideals (such as multiculturalism) that often 
align with the preferences of immigrants, their policy-decisions could be shaped by a desire 
to expand a favourable voter-base (Birrell, 2002, p.38). In other words, they could be 
motivated to increase the percentage of Left-leaning immigrants voting in elections.  
In the Australian context, derivations of this argument have been made about the Labor 
Party. Both Birrell and Jupp have analysed the voting pattern of immigrants, highlighting 
significant trends in electoral preferences. Birrell has shown that, between citizens who are 
either born in Australia or come from a non-English speaking background, there is a 
meaningful difference in voting tendencies. The former disproportionately vote Coalition, 
whilst the latter are more likely to vote Labor (2002, p.38). Based on a similar principle, 
Jupp has pointed out that, in 2001, there were twenty seats in which over thirty percent of 
residents spoke a language other than English at home. In that year’s election, all but one 
was held by the Labor Party (Jupp, 2002, p.33). And whilst permanent migrants and those 
from non-English speaking backgrounds are not necessarily synonymous, their overlap does 
lend credence to the theories linking immigration and the Left. Of course, in a relatively 
zero-sum electoral system, the inverse implication is that parties of the Right (in Australia, 
the Liberal Party) could have a motivation to minimise the intake of a potentially adversarial 
voting bloc. Thus, in the context of this thesis, this theory offers one plausible cause of 
partisan difference: because of the electoral tendencies of future residents, Labor could 
possess a greater political incentive to maximise the country’s migrant intake.  
 
However, these constituent-based arguments are not simply about the voting intentions of 
future residents. They are also about the way that migration policy interacts with the 
desires and demands of existing electoral blocs.  In Australia, the two major political parties 
have relationships, established either formally or informally, with groups that have distinct 
interests in the country’s migration program. On the centre-left, the Australian Labor Party 
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has an historically developed and institutionally entrenched affiliation with the union 
movement. Indeed, as its name suggests, the ALP was initially designed to function as the 
political arm of organised labour (McMullin, 1991, pp.1-14). In a contemporary setting, the 
party continues to explicitly acknowledge this relationship, clearly stating its commitment 
to a ‘future partnership with trade unions’ (ALP, 2011). And in terms of the party’s modern 
structures of governance, unions remain institutionally significant: despite recent attempts 
to dilute their influence, they still account for fifty percent of its federal conference delegates 
(Allan, 2002, p.50; Kuhn and Bramble, 2007, p.7).  
Because of immigration’s impact on labour markets, migration scholars have tended to 
assume that these unions have an interest in supporting ‘selective, exclusionary and 
restrictive policies’ (Avci and Mcdonald, 2000, p.198). As Freeman argues, a higher 
immigrant intake has the capacity to undermine the bargaining power of labour. Because 
labour’s ability to demand better pay and working conditions is partially dictated by the 
state of unemployment (in other words, how ‘tight’ a labour market is; the size of its ‘reserve 
army of labour’), an expanding labour pool both increases competition for jobs and, 
according to classical economic assumptions, tends to exert downward pressure on wages 
(Freeman, 1997, p.47). Whilst this characterisation of unions has faced certain recent 
challenges, with some work suggesting a gradual change in perspective and a need for 
greater conceptual nuance4 , the common scholarly assumption is still that large migration 
programs skew labour markets against the interests of unions and are generally perceived 
as threatening (Donnelly, 2011, p.6). Moreover, this threat can be seen to heighten in 
periods of rising unemployment, where the labour market conditions challenging union 
interests are broadly intensified (Haus, 1999, p.683). Here we can see that, at least for the 
                                                          
4 Watts, for instance, has argued that union leadership in France, Italy and Spain have moved towards 
supporting more open immigration policies (2002). However, as Donnelly points out, her argument 
focuses on countries in which there are large numbers of undocumented workers. Watts suggests that the 
nation’s inability to formally regulate immigration encourages a more pragmatic stance by labour 
(Donnelly, 2011, p.5-6). With its unique geography, this particular argument (assuming a critical mass of 
undocumented workers) does not seem as applicable to Australia.  
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Labor Party, constituent-based imperatives are not necessarily coherent; whilst the migrant 
community may comprise a potentially significant and favourable electoral bloc, so too does 
a trade union movement with an economic interest in smaller migration programs.   
 
We can apply a similar, but inverted, principle to the Coalition. Whilst the links might not be 
as formal as Labor’s ties with the unions, the Liberal Party has maintained a political 
relationship with the business community. As both Betts and Irving have argued, Coalition 
governments have tended to grant privileged access to business groups, who are generally 
considered to be one of the party’s key constituencies (2006, p.40; 1980, pp.289-91). In 
contrast to the union movement, these commercial interests are often assisted by larger 
migration programs. Because they largely benefit from an increased pool of workers (on top 
of the added, capital-biased impact on wages), business groups have tended to endorse 
higher intakes, especially in those categories covering skilled migrants (Freeman and 
Kessler, 2008, p.667). Indeed, as Betts has shown, important elements of Australia’s 
business community have provided powerful support for the country’s migration program: 
they have constituted, in her words, a significant portion of Australia’s ‘growth lobby’ (2006, 
p.43-46). The Australian Industry Group, for instance, one of the country’s largest employer 
associations, has consistently and vocally backed the expansion of Australia’s intake 
(Mackinnon, 2009, p.351; The Australian, 2011). Thus, like Labor, the needs of large 
electoral and financial supporters are not always in line with other constituent-based 
concerns; large intakes might facilitate a potentially adversarial voting bloc, but they also 
tend to be supported by the business community, one of the party’s traditionally vital 
constituencies. Ultimately, though, regardless of motivational contradictions, the key point 
here is that, because of migration’s relationship with certain electoral blocs, there are 
reasons why the parties could behave differently. The desires of key constituent-groups 
create distinct and partisan political imperatives. 
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The other side of these theoretical differences concerns ‘ideology’. Whilst a potentially more 
difficult term to quantify, it refers to ‘purer’ motivations. These are the motivations that 
stem from normative stances on the role of the state, relatively free from the 
aforementioned electoral calculations. For instance, Lahav has argued that, because the Left 
is philosophically inclined towards using state power to amend disadvantage, it is ‘more 
likely to extend immigrant rights ... and be more open to increased immigration than its 
colleagues on the right’ (2004, p.133). Ireland has echoed this argument, asserting that, 
because of these principles, we should ‘expect to see Left parties systematically advocating 
policy preferences that are more pro-immigrant in nature’ (2004; Breunig and Luedtke, 
2008, p.129). This is one ideological reason as to why the two major parties could engage 
with the migration program differently: based on the philosophical aspiration to spread 
opportunity and actively redress disadvantage, the theory suggests that the centre-Left 
would be more likely to extend migratory rights (and all of their corollary benefits) to a 
greater number of people.  
The converse point here is that, because of certain ideological positions, we could expect 
parties of the Right to be more anti-immigrant in disposition. On top of conflicting ideas over 
the state’s relationship with disadvantage, it has also been argued that an aversion to 
multiculturalism could push the Right towards more restrictionist policies (Van Der Valk, 
2003, p.335). Because modern migration invariably involves the partial importation of non-
Western culture (especially in a post-racialist context, where less than a quarter of 
Australia’s immigrants are sourced from Europe and North America [DIAC, 2011a]), a 
party’s stance on multiculturalism has been linked to its stance on the migration program. 
Indeed, whilst the extent to which this is applicable to Australia has been debated, there 
have been arguments that link a greater belief in cultural homogeneity to anti-immigrant 
politics (Diamond, 1999, p.175; Lewins, 1987, pp.261-273). In France and the US, for 
instance, the Right has cited the need for cultural ‘harmony’ as a reason to restrict arrivals 
(Van Der Valk, 2003, p.335). Again, these ‘ideological’ theories do not necessarily cohere 
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with all the arguments concerning constituent-groups, but they do present further plausible 
motivators of distinction. Because of their different philosophical assumptions about 
disadvantage and cultural homogeneity, parties of the Left and Right could potentially react 
differently to migration policy. 
Thus, as emphasised, the existing theories on political parties and migration do not conform 
to one clear narrative. Certain constituent and ideology-based imperatives suggest that 
Labor could prefer larger intakes, whilst others assert that the Liberal Party could benefit 
from increased permanent migration. However, accepting this inconsistency, the key point 
here is that there are cogent, theoretical reasons as to why the major parties could behave 
differently. Moreover, these theories are important insofar as they provide a conceptual 
framework for understanding the paper’s later  empirical analysis: they present reasons to 
explain why the parties could have guided the program in certain, and potentially distinct, 
directions.  
 
1.4: Conclusion 
With the aim of providing background for the paper’s more original analysis, this chapter 
has had two primary functions. Firstly, it has contextualised the research topic. Looking 
primarily at 2010’s federal election, it highlighted how, in a recent period of inter-party 
competition, partisan actors have openly engaged with issues surrounding the migration 
program. The significant implication of this analysis being that, because this interaction has 
at times existed, the paper’s question is of some practical and academic concern: that is, if 
there has been an outward and rhetorical relationship between parties and the migration 
program, we should scrutinise the extent to which there has also been a substantive one. 
Secondly, it has reviewed the topic’s existing literature. Empirically, it illustrated the 
considerable work which has analysed the historical interaction between parties and 
Australia’s migration program; theoretically, it highlighted the literature which has 
suggested why they could be motivated to behave uniquely. However, for the thesis’ specific 
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question, this review found that Australia’s literature has not yet searched for longer-term 
inter-party tendencies. It has not yet united multiple Labor and Liberal administrations and 
examined whether, over an extended historical period, the major parties have possessed 
distinct dispositions. In terms of both size and composition, the paper’s subsequent analysis 
will attempt to answer this precise question.  
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Chapter II 
The Size of the Migration Program, 1972-2010 
 
When discussing the politics of the migration program, size matters. Indeed, in both popular 
and academic debate, much of the existing rhetoric and analysis has concerned the sheer 
number of people entering the country. For instance, in our 2010 case study, Tony Abbott 
explicitly promised to reduce the annual migrant intake to 170,000. In professing a 
preference for a more ‘sustainable’ policy trajectory, Julia Gillard’s statements on population 
were, if they were to possess any substance, also at least partially referring to the program’s 
size (Tony Abbott MP, 2010; SMH, 2010; Murray, 2010, p.6). This numerical focus has also 
been a feature of the existing theoretical and empirical literature: as discussed, scholars 
have frequently defined governments’ policy stances by the amount of people they annually 
admit (Price, 1979; Patience 1989; Higley et al, 2011; Birrell, 2010). This chapter will share 
this emphasis. It will ask whether, between Labor and Liberal governments, there has been a 
substantive difference in the number of people granted permanent entry into Australia.   
 
To measure this, the thesis will use data specifically from Australia’s ‘migration program’. As 
stated, the ‘migration program’ contains visas issued solely for permanent residence, 
encompassing the family reunion, skilled and special eligibility streams (DOPS, 2010a, p.1). 
Using this as our primary evidential source of party behaviour carries two clear 
methodological strengths. Firstly, the program’s size has a direct relationship with the 
executive decisions of partisan actors. As enshrined in 1958’s Migration Act, the relevant 
Minister is granted the power to ‘cap’ the number of permanent visas that can be granted 
each year (DIAC, 2011e).  When compared with the other main measurements of migration 
(primarily Net Overseas Migration [NOM]5 and the temporary intake6) ministerial discretion 
                                                          
5 Net Overseas Migration (NOM) covers both long-term immigration and emigration: it refers to the 
difference between the amount of people entering and leaving the country for an extended period of time. 
Because governments have a negligible influence over the country’s emigration levels, it is an 
inappropriate measurement for analysing partisanship (DOPS, 2010b).  
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plays a much more direct role in dictating the program’s size. Because of this, it is more 
likely to reflect the existence of any partisan distinction. Indeed, when studying the way that 
different governments have influenced migration levels, much of the existing literature has 
used this as its statistical basis (see: Patience, 1989; Betts 2003; Birrell, 2010).  
Secondly, the other major measurements carry data-based limitations. With temporary 
arrivals, the available data describes elements of the intake (in particular, students and 
business 457s visas) going back to 1996 (DoPs, 2010b, p.14). However, as these reflect only 
two parts of the overall temporary migrant-pool, the evidence only presents a limited 
picture of impermanent migration. Furthermore, by describing a fourteen year window with 
just a short period of Labor governance, the data only provides a narrow opportunity for 
inter-party analysis. For Net Overseas Migration (NOM), there are figures that go back to 
1925 (DoPS, 2010b, p.1). However, because these numbers encompass both immigration 
and emigration (they refer to the difference between those entering and leaving Australia 
for an extended period of time [see: fn.5]), they are unsuitable for a paper focussing on 
partisanship’s interaction with immigration levels. When compared with the temporary and 
NOM figures, the ‘migration program’ (and the preceding information on permanent ‘settler 
arrivals’) offers a longer-term7 and more appropriate data set for examining party 
distinction (Betts, 1999; DoPS, 2010b, p.13). Ultimately, it contains both the requisite 
information for genuine inter-party analysis and a closer relationship with the active 
decisions of executive government.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6 The temporary intake is comprised of tourists, students, short-term business people, skilled temporary 
residents and diplomats (DIAC, 2011). Unlike permanent migration, the level of temporary migration to 
Australia is not usually determined by government, but is more explicitly demand-driven (DoPS, 2010b, 
p.11). 
7 Data specifically describing the Migration Program begins in 1984. However, there are relevant figures 
on ‘permanent settlers’ that begin earlier. For this paper, however, we require information on where these 
settlers specifically originated: because the Migration Program does not include New Zealand arrivals, we 
must subtract these from the overall ‘permanent’ figures. Katherine Betts’ book ‘The Great Divide’ (1999) 
includes this information from 1972 onwards. Hence, in order to create an applicable data-set, we must 
subtract the ‘New Zealand’ settlers from the ‘total’ column. 
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In terms of length, the chapter will confine its examination to the period from 1972-2010. 
Whilst this is partially due to data-based considerations (see: fn.7), it also carries certain 
conceptual benefits. This is primarily because 1972’s election of the Whitlam Labor 
government signalled the official end to the ‘White Australia Policy’ (Jupp, 2002, p.220). 
Whilst the racialist criteria had been gradually dismantled in the years preceding (the Holt 
government stated that applications would be accepted from ‘well-qualified people on the 
basis of their suitability as settlers, their ability to integrate readily and their possession of 
qualifications useful to Australia’ [Jordan, 2006, p.240]), the last vestiges of the policy were 
finally abolished by the Labor government (Tavan, 2004, pp.109-125). This situates the 
paper in the ‘modern’ era of migration policy, insofar as government decisions were no 
longer dictated by explicitly racialist imperatives. Furthermore, in a more practical 
consideration, the period also possesses an analytically useful inter-party symmetry: over 
the thirty nine years, Labor held government for twenty years, while the Liberal Party was 
in power for nineteen.  
 
To answer its question, Chapter Two will use a three-step method. Firstly, it will cross-
analyse the permanent data against the party of government. In a relatively blunt, numerical 
sense, this will uncover whether either party has promoted disproportionately high (or low) 
migrant intakes. Secondly, to add a degree of explanatory nuance, it will study this 
relationship in the context of the labour-market variable. This will attempt to control for 
unemployment and test whether, when placed in similar economic climates, the parties have 
behaved differently. Finally, it will test these results against periods of inter-party transition. 
By allowing a more in-depth focus on specific governments, this will do two things: it will 
analyse whether a change in party has signalled a change in policy and, more significantly, it 
will examine how the evidence reflects the complex motivations of party behaviour 
discussed in Chapter One. Ultimately, these three steps will each answer the paper’s central 
question from slightly different, but largely complementary, angles.  
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2.1 Size and Political Parties: the Immediate Picture 
Ignoring the influence of external variables, this first section will cross analyse the migration 
program’s size with the party in office. This will attempt to provide an initial, relatively blunt 
picture of how parties have related to the migration program and examine whether, prima 
facie, there has been a partisan difference in the size of intakes. However, by scrutinising 
these results, the section will ultimately question the analytical value of such a direct, 
variable-free method. 
Figure One: Australia’s Permanent Migration Program as Size and as Ratio of Population (1972-2010). 
 
Source: size: 1972-1996, Betts (1999), 1997-2010, DoPS (2010b), population figures: DoPS (2010b).  
 
 
Figure One maps Australia’s migration program since 1972 and the election of Whitlam’s 
Labor government. The trends are disaggregated into both the gross permanent intake 
(signified by the black line) and as a ratio of population (shown in grey). To get this ‘ratio’, 
I’ve taken the gross data and divided it by each relevant year’s population figure. This 
chapter will use the relative measurement, as it allows a fairer quantitative comparison 
between different eras and more genuinely reflects the proportionate impact of respective 
programs. This is an attempt to overcome the difficulty of evaluating temporally disparate 
administrations. An intake of 100,000 under Whitlam, for instance, would hardly be 
comparable to a Howard government promoting a numerically identical program.  
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A cursory glance at the graph shows that, since Whitlam, the grey trend-line has experienced 
considerable oscillation: even within single party terms, like the Hawke-Keating years, there 
have been substantial differences between the peaks and troughs in permanent arrivals. 
However, for the paper’s specific question, we must break the data down along partisan 
lines and question the extent to which these broader fluctuations reflect inter-party 
differences.    
 
Table One: Individual Governments and the Average Permanent Intake 
Government Average Permanent 
Intake 
Average Intake 
as % of Population 
Range (largest 
intake – lowest 
intake) 
Whitlam (ALP) 94,921 0.70% 0.37%-0.86% 
Fraser (Liberal) 74,558 0.51% 0.39%-0.69% 
Hawke/Keating (ALP) 90,994 0.54% 0.33%-0.77% 
Howard (Liberal) 106,467 0.54% 0.36%-0.75% 
Rudd/Gillard (ALP) 169,547 0.78% 0.77%-0.8% 
Source: 1972-1996, Betts (1999), 1997-2010, APH (2010), Population figures, APH (2010). 
 
 
 
Table Two: Political Parties and the Average Permanent Intake 
Party Average Permanent Intake Average Intake as Ratio of 
Population 
ALP 103,504 0.0061 
Liberal Party 93,032 0.0052 
Source: 1972-1996, Betts (1999), 1997-2010, APH (2010), Population figures, APH (2010). 
 
 
 
Table One disaggregates the post-White Australia permanent programs into the period’s five 
separate governments. More specifically, it averages out the proportionate intake over the 
entirety of each administration’s time in office. In a direct numerical sense, this is 
attempting to represent a government’s average approach to the program’s size. Table Two 
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applies the same logic, but unites the results along party lines. In other words, all the Liberal 
data is grouped and then averaged, with the same method applied to Labor.  
In terms of a partisan difference, Tables One and Two do, at face value, present a degree of 
positive evidence. However, contrary to Chapter One’s hypothesis (the theory pieced 
together from the existing literature, suggesting that the Liberal Party might prefer larger 
programs), the descriptive data tentatively points to a relationship between Labor and 
higher intakes. As Table One suggests, since 1972, the two highest average programs were 
registered under Labor Prime Ministers. The Whitlam and Rudd-Gillard administrations 
supported intakes that respectively averaged 0.7% and 0.78% of population. This means 
that, when compared with the other three governments (which chronologically averaged 
0.51%, 0.54% and 0.54%), these individual Labor regimes promoted historically higher 
proportionate targets. And with the period registering an overall mean of 0.56% and a 
standard deviation of 0.16%, the two governments were actually relatively significant 
outliers. Moreover, across the period’s five administrations, no Liberal government 
endorsed a higher average program than any of the available ALP administrations (despite 
the wealth of literature linking the period’s executive transition to different programs, 
Hawke-Keating and Howard’s averages, at 0.54%, were functionally the same [see: Patience, 
1989; Collins, 1995; Betts, 2003]). Ultimately, with each consecutive administration, the 
program’s average size either rose or remained stationary under Labor. 
If we take a further, more historical step back, then the ‘Labor supports more immigrants’ 
narrative is reinforced. Table Two, which highlights the total party averages across thirty-
nine years of available data, implies a Labor Party disposition towards more expansive 
programs. Whilst an admittedly crude measurement, it shows that, since White Australia, 
the ALP’s total mean has outweighed the Coalition’s. The former has averaged a program of 
0.61% of population, whilst the latter has averaged 0.52%. Indeed, across the entirety of the 
thirty-eight year period, Labor’s average intakes have been proportionately superior to the 
Liberal Party’s. Thus, ignoring the influence of other variables, these descriptive statistics do 
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lend some credence to the idea that Labor has aligned itself with higher permanent 
migration targets: at face value, there is an apparent link between ALP governance and 
larger proportionate programs. However, we should be cautious when accepting such a 
relationship on the strength of this evidence alone. Within the data-set, there are certain 
points which complicate the relationship, implying other important, unaccounted for 
variables.  
 
The most compelling refutation to the aforementioned conclusion is that, accounting for all 
five administrations, there is not a clear, all-encompassing correlation between Labor 
governance and higher relative intakes. If we look at the middle three governments (which 
actually account for over four-fifths of the years in the data-sample), there was very little 
observable difference between the Labor and Liberal parties. The Fraser, Hawke-Keating 
and Howard administrations all promoted average relative intakes within 0.03% of each 
other. As stated, the Hawke-Keating programs were nearly identical to Howard’s, with 
Fraser’s regime registering only slightly less. In fact, in this thirty-two year period, the 
average party intakes were almost proportionately inseparable.  
Contrary to these governments (which all occupied office for at least eight years), the 
periods that skew the data, covering 1972-75 and 2007-10, both represent relatively short 
administrations. As will be explored in the next section, it seems quite possible that these 
comparatively brief governments only faced certain external climates and, because of this, 
experienced situations more conducive to higher average intakes. Indeed, as Collins has 
argued, we should be mindful to only compare migration decisions made in similar contexts, 
especially considering the changing policy imperatives associated with different economic 
environments (1995, p.2). This suggests that measurements like Table Two (which assumes 
that each year’s migration program can be compared at face value) are misguided and of 
only limited academic use: they are too crude to reflect the material significance of economic 
context. Thus, because of both the lack of a comprehensive correlation and the relatively 
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short life-spans of the outlying administrations, the available evidence implies that, in order 
to gain a more accurate insight into partisanship’s relationship with the migration program, 
we require measurements that control for further variables.  
The other important piece of conflicting evidence concerns intra-government fluctuation. As 
Figure One suggests, some of the most extreme examples of oscillation have existed within 
periods of uni-party governance. For instance, as Jupp has alluded to, in the Hawke-Keating 
years, the program varied from just above 0.3% of the population to almost 0.8% (2002, 
p.47; Table One). To differing extents, the Whitlam, Fraser, and Howard governments all 
experienced similar bi-polar swings (see: Figure One). If parties were stable variables in 
their own right (that is, if they possessed coherent preferences that transcended context), 
then we would not expect such substantial variations within terms: if the party in office was 
consistent, so too should have been the intake. Again, like the aforementioned points, this 
suggests that parties cannot be read in a vacuum. Their import can only be truly gauged in 
the context of further variables. Therefore, whilst not completely ruling out the possibility of 
a link between parties and particular policy preferences, both these points suggest that a 
simple cross-analysis of parties and migration size is too blunt to be analytically robust. If 
we wish to genuinely understand, and potentially even prove, such a relationship, we have 
to control for the external environment that frames these migratory decisions.  
 
2.2. The Economy, Political Parties and Permanent Migration 
As alluded to, the external variable which most seems to frame this debate is the economy. 
According to classical economic theory, a healthy economic environment is conducive to 
large migration programs. Because migration adds to the existing pool of workers, 
governments have often used it to fill gaps in a tight labour market. Conversely, periods of 
stagnancy and high unemployment have often pressured countries into minimising their 
intake (Simon, 1989: Breunig and Luedtke, 2008, p.129). Indeed, in Australia’s empirical 
literature, both Jupp and Collins have argued that policy has been shaped by the different 
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imperatives associated with different economic climates (1995, p.2; 2002, p.47). Because of 
this, it seems disingenuous to divorce the behaviour of parties from the economic contexts 
in which they have governed: migratory decisions are not driven entirely by party autonomy 
and should not be treated as such.  
Looking at recent examples of migration policy, this argument appears demonstrably true. 
As Labor’s Minister for Immigration, Chris Evans acknowledged that Australia’s migration 
program is partially dictated ‘on the basis of demand for labour … and that is obviously 
linked to our economy’ (Hansard, 2010, p.41). Moreover, when his government reassessed 
the intake’s annual size, he explicitly cited the influence of economic conditions: the move to 
reduce the intake, Evans argued, ‘reflects the economic climate’ (MIAC, 2009). Indeed, if we 
go beyond this particular example of party governance, we can see that the size of 
Australia’s intake has been historically reactive to certain, but not all, macroeconomic 
indicators (see: Figure Two and Three). 
Figure Two: GDP Growth and Relative Intakes, 1972-2010 
 
Source: for population and migration, see: figure one, for growth figures: World Bank (2011). 
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Figure Three: Unemployment and Relative Intakes, 1972-2010. 
 
Source: for population and migration, see: figure one, for unemployment, see: Treasury (2000) and ABS (2010).  
 
 
Respectively, Figures Two and Three chart the country’s GDP growth and unemployment 
levels against its permanent intake. However, as we can see, the permanent program 
appears much more responsive to the latter than the former. As GDP has grown, there has 
not been a consistent or reliable rise in immigration; in fact, considerable GDP growth has 
often coexisted with a relatively small migrant intake (see: 1993-2000). On the other hand, 
as unemployment has fallen, the permanent program has tended to inversely rise. This 
makes intellectual sense, insofar as the classical economic arguments suggest that, as 
migration decisions directly interact with the labour market, they are more likely to be 
influenced by the state of employment than the nation’s gross production (Simon, 1989: 
Breunig and Luedtke, 2008, p.129). Because of this theoretical and historic relationship, this 
chapter use Australia’s unemployment rate as its economic variable8. The section wants to 
control for the fluctuating imperative and test whether, when facing a similar economic 
climate, there has been an observable distinction in party behaviour.  
                                                          
8 Beyond unemployment, there are further available labour market indicators. The unemployment rate 
does not tell us the composition of the labour force: importantly, it ignores the internal break-down 
between the Australians in full-time work and those that are ‘underemployed’ (Denniss, 2001, p.1-5). 
Since the 1970s, the balance between the former and latter has been increasingly skewed towards 
underemployment (ABS, 2010b). However, for this paper, unemployment is a more suitable variable for 
two main reasons. Firstly, we require a labour-market indicator that has been recorded stably since 1972 
(ABS, 2010b). Secondly, and more importantly, the migration program has been more historically reactive 
to the overall unemployment rate than underemployment. Indeed, especially since the early 1990s, a 
relatively stable and comparatively high level of underemployment has existed alongside a range of 
different sized migration programs (ABS, 2010b; Figure One). This is perhaps due to ‘unemployment’s’ 
greater visibility as a labour indicator, traditionally being the primary public measurement of labour 
market performance (Denniss, 2001, p.iv).   
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Unemployment
Permanent
Program as
ratio of
population
Political Parties and Australia’s Migration Program Shaun Crowe 
 
36 | P a g e  
 
Table Three: Unemployment, Political Parties and Proportionate Intakes, 1972-2010. 
<4% Average Range 
ALP 0.78% 0.75-0.82% 
Liberal Party N/A N/A 
 
4-6% Average Range 
ALP 0.70% 0.38 - 0.86% 
Liberal Party 0.60% 0.39 - 0.75% 
 
6.1-8.5% Average Range 
ALP 0.59% 0.43 – 0.76% 
Liberal Party 0.45% 0.36 – 0.65% 
 
>8.5% Average Range 
ALP 0.46% 0.33-0.64% 
Liberal Party 0.56% 0.47-0.64% 
Source: for population and migration, see: Figure One, 
for unemployment, see: Treasury (2000) and ABS (2010). 
 
Table Three is an attempt to control for the economy. It sorts the data years into groups 
based on the range of unemployment in which it sat and the party that was in government; it 
then averages out each party’s relative intakes. By only comparing governments facing 
similar levels of unemployment, it aims to reflect how the parties have acted when placed in 
a parallel economic climate. Granted, the specific brackets are somewhat arbitrary, but that 
seems like an unfortunate necessity for any study numerically delineating between different 
‘environments’.  
Table Three provides some empirical evidence for the classical economic theories linking 
the state of the labour market with migration decisions. As we can see, there has been an 
overall, but not quite unanimous, tendency towards promoting larger programs in periods 
of lower unemployment. However, for the paper’s specific question, it also provides a 
certain degree of support for the previous section’s conclusions. Indeed, the measurement 
suggests that, when faced with certain economic imperatives, the Labor Party has possessed 
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a more expansionist disposition. In the periods when unemployment has sat between 4-6% 
and 6.1-8.5%, which actually account for over three quarters of our data set, the ALP has 
promoted higher relative intakes than their Liberal counterparts. In the 4-6% bracket, Labor 
averaged a program of 0.7% of population, whilst the Liberals’ mean was 0.6%. This means 
that, in the shared context of a robust and relatively tight jobs-market, the Labor Party has 
been historically more expansionist in disposition.  
Similarly, when joblessness has crept higher, sitting between 6.1 and 8.5%, again the ALP’s 
average program has been more generous, this time by a larger margin of 0.59% to 0.45%. 
This particular result seems both curious and potentially illuminating: considering the 
Labor Party’s relationship with the union movement, we might theoretically expect 
organised labour’s opposition to migration to rise alongside unemployment (Haus, 1999, 
p.683). Instead, the inter-party gap actually grew larger as joblessness increased.  As we will 
expand upon in the next section, this specific result may help to disentangle the complex 
motivators driving the Labor Party’s historical approach to the program. However, beyond 
this observation, the key point here is that, in the two economic brackets that account for 
the majority of the data-set, the Labor Party has promoted visibly higher intakes. When 
unemployment has sat between 4% and 8.5%, the ALP’s migration programs have been 
proportionately superior to the Liberal Party’s. Ultimately, by controlling for the external 
environment that has framed party decisions, this chapter can now lend the previous 
section’s suppositions (linking Labor with larger programs) a greater degree of nuance and 
explanatory muscle.  
 
However, when gauging the strength of this conclusion and the extent to which it reflects 
party differences, we should acknowledge a few caveats. The first is that, despite Labor’s 
average intakes being higher, the gaps between the parties have not beenuniformly large. 
For instance, when unemployment sat between 4 and 6%, the ALP’s average was 0.7% and 
the Coalition’s was 0.6%. Statistically speaking, with a mean of 0.63% and a standard 
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deviation of 0.17%, the behaviour of the two parties, whilst different, was not enormously 
so: both parties’ average intakes were well within the one unit of deviation. The next 
bracket’s disparity was admittedly more meaningful, but, again, not by a great deal. With a 
mean of 0.52% and a standard deviation of 0.14%, the partisan distinction (of 0.59% and 
0.45%) did again sit between the one unit of deviation. This point is simply attempting to 
place the differences in some sort of perspective. Whilst Labor’s proportionate intakes have 
certainly been more generous in these particular economic contexts, we should 
acknowledge that the results have not always been tremendously dissimilar.  
Secondly, within brackets of unemployment, the size of partisan programs have not always 
aligned or appeared coherent: when in similar economic environments, uni-party intakes 
have been often quite disparate. For instance, when unemployment has sat between 6.1 and 
8.5%, the ALP and Liberal Party’s respective intakes have ranged from 0.43 – 0.76% and 
0.36 – 0.65%. Similar spreads were registered in both the two other major brackets (see: 
Table Three). Whilst this partially reflects outlying years, the intra-bracket ranges do 
suggest that, across different periods, the parties have not always responded to the same 
environment with the same, or coherent, motivations and mindsets. At times their 
dispositions have been more expansionist and at times they have been more restrictionist. 
As the next section will explore, this could potentially reflect the contradictory nature (see: 
section 1.3) of motivations governing partisan behaviour.   
The final important caveat is that not all economic brackets have conformed to this 
purported trend. When unemployment has transcended 8.5% (which has comprised less 
than one-sixth of the period’s years) the Liberal Party, rather than Labor, has implemented 
more generous programs.  In this, the highest bracket of unemployment, the Liberal average 
has been 0.56%, whilst Labor’s average has been 0.46%. Again, this point is attempting to 
qualify the inter-party trend: even if the majority of evidence suggests a relationship 
between Labor and higher intakes, it has still not been unanimously reflected in all our 
measurements.  
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Whilst Australia’s existing scholarship has often acknowledged the interaction between 
labour markets and parties’ migratory decisions (Collins, 1995; Jupp, 2002; Simon, 1989: 
Breunig and Luedtke, 2008, p.129), it has not yet attempted to explicitly control for the 
former’s influence. This section has designed and implemented one such method of doing 
this. However, contrary to both Chapter One’s hypothesis and the theories relating the 
labour-movement to a more restrictionist disposition (Freeman, 1997, p.47; Donnelly, 2011, 
p.6), our measurements have found a tentative link between the Labor Party and more 
expansive programs. When unemployment has sat between 4% and 8.5% (the two brackets 
which account for over three quarters of the thirty-nine year period), Labor’s average 
intakes have been larger than the Liberal’s. The only bracket that coincided with a higher 
Liberal intake was when unemployment surpassed 8.5%, which, at less than one-sixth of the 
data-set, represented a relatively short period of history. When answering the paper’s 
question (about the potential existence of a partisan difference), we should acknowledge 
both this positive evidence and these qualifiers. Ultimately, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that, controlling for unemployment, the period has registered an uneven, yet observable 
relationship between Labor and larger programs. However, we must concede that this inter-
party distinction has been neither enormously large nor uniformly reflected across all 
economic contexts.   
2.3. Transitionary Periods of Governance: Partisanship and Potential Motivators 
Such a long-term, almost panoptical style of analysis does, however, carry one major 
limitation. Whilst giving an important overview of longer-term partisan tendencies, it only 
has a limited capacity to illuminate where these trends have stemmed from: in other words, 
it does not tell us the reasons why the parties have behaved as they have.  With this in mind, 
the chapter’s final section will take a closer examination of the period’s governments. By 
focussing on the times where power was transferred from one major party to the other, it 
will do two things. Firstly, to further answer the paper’s question, it will ask whether, as the 
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party in office has changed, so too has the program’s size. This transposes much of the 
existing literature’s implicit logic (that is, that if political parties were themselves important 
variables, we would expect a parliamentary change to coincide within a change in the 
volume of permanent arrivals [see: Price, 1979; Patience, 1989; Betts 2003]) to a longer 
historical period. Secondly, it will explore the ways in which individual governments have 
illuminated the tensions between the complex motivations of party behaviour (see: Chapter 
1.3). Ultimately, it will argue that, rather than remaining static, the relative importance of 
these imperatives has fluctuated over time. Moreover, it will link these changing motivations 
with the previous section’s findings, arguing that they have partially driven the period’s lack 
of intra-bracket coherence (see: Table Three, ‘range’).  
Figure Four: Permanent Migration and Unemployment from Whitlam to Fraser (1972-1983) 
 
Source: for migration, see: 1972-1996, Betts (1999), for employment: Treasury (2000).  
 
Figure Four maps the Whitlam and Fraser administrations’ intakes against unemployment. 
When comparing the two governments, Freeman and Birrell have argued that the Liberal 
Party ‘restored [the migration program] as an important national priority’ (2001, p.532). 
Indeed, a number of other commentators have observed a similar link between the Liberal 
administration and larger programs (Price, 1979, p.212-213; Tavan, 2005, p.427; Allsop, 
2008, p.22). However, when attempting to understand the two governments’ migration 
policies, and also the reasons behind them, a more economics-conscious reading of the 
evidence seems necessary; indeed, some of the pieces appear too dualistic to provide an 
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accurate insight into the partisan dynamic (see: Price, 1979). Like the previous section 
suggested, rather than defining the regimes in numerical binaries (that is, irrespective of 
context, whether they have preferred either large or small intakes), what seems important is 
the parties’ unique reactions to different economic climates.  
Firstly, this seems true because the early Whitlam years coincided with relatively large 
migration programs. As Betts has pointed out, when the Labor Government was elected in 
1972, it kept the intake high (2006, p.42).  As we can see in Figure Four, the first two 
Whitlam years (which corresponded with the thirty-nine year period’s lowest rates of 
unemployment) actually registered larger programs than at any time during Fraser’s tenure. 
The program remained, in the words of Birrell and Freeman, ‘an important national priority’. 
Consequently, any distinction between the governments did not appear to have stemmed 
from the parties’ inalienable dispositions (that is, preferences which ignored context), but 
rather unique responses to different economic imperatives: in other words, there seems to 
have been a partisan difference in the parties’ reactions to rising unemployment.  
As Figure Four shows, after the government’s initially high intakes, the Labor party cut the 
program quite drastically in 1975. This substantial reduction (the government actually 
halved the intake) was made in the direct context of a jump in unemployment (Allsop, 2008, 
p.22). Indeed, the timing of the cuts suggests that the era’s Labor Party was highly sensitive 
to the caprices of the labour market: as Betts has argued, whilst partially influenced by 
concerns over urban and environmental pressures, these decisions were fundamentally 
driven by changing dynamics in the nation’s employment (2006, p.42-43).  If, as much of the 
literature suggests, the Fraser government was more expansionist in disposition than Labor, 
it was largely because of its response to this particular economic imperative. Whilst its rise 
was not as drastic as Whitlam’s reductions (despite gradual increases in joblessness, the 
intake remained relatively stable until 1979 [see: Figure Four]) the government did 
meaningfully increase permanent arrivals during its final term. And as Foster and Stockley 
have pointed out, this expansion was particularly striking, insofar as it coexisted with a 
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relatively high, and broadly rising, state of unemployment (1988, p.12). Thus, if there was a 
partisan distinction between Fraser and Whitlam, it was not based on crude preferences for 
either higher or lower intakes: policy differences stemmed from conflicting approaches to 
certain labour market imperatives.  
When attempting to understand the reasons behind the era’s partisan behaviour, these 
results appear quite illuminating. As Haus has argued, we would theoretically expect 
organised labour’s opposition to immigration (insofar as its interests are threatened by 
large intakes [Freeman, 1997, p.47]) to heighten in periods of increasing unemployment, 
whereby the labour market conditions challenging unions are broadly amplified (1999, 
p.683). Indeed, at least notionally, the interests of the labour movement appear particularly 
elastic: even more so than other partisan motivations (especially the relatively static 
imperatives associated with ideology and multiculturalism) the intensity of its preferences 
is shaped by the state of employment. Looking at Figure Four, Whitlam’s government did 
broadly reflect these theoretical assumptions. The party’s approach to the migration 
program closely followed economic trends; its policy became substantively more 
restrictionist as unemployment rose. And, as Warhurst has pointed out, it is impossible to 
divorce these active choices from the party’s relationship with labour: they were, in his 
words, largely due to ‘pressure from the trade union movement’ (1996, p.249). Indeed, at 
the time, labour took a largely restrictionist stance towards the program. The country’s 
largest peak body, the Australian Council of Trade Unions, consistently expressed misgivings 
about the general size of permanent migration (Quinlin and Lever-Tracy, 1990, p.175-76). 
Thus, because its response to different economic climates was contextually congruous with 
and directly influenced by the interests of unions, Figure Four does suggest that, more so 
than the left-wing reasons for larger programs (such as the more constant ideological and 
political capital imperatives associated with multiculturalism [see: section 1.3; Borowski, 
2000, pp.464-465]), the Whitlam government was primarily influenced by its formal and 
philosophical affiliation with labour.  
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Whilst gradual and not of a tremendously large scale, the era’s partisan difference seems to 
have primarily stemmed from this motivational disparity. Fraser’s Liberal Party shared 
Labor’s ideological support for multiculturalism (and, as some have cynically suggested, its 
desire to court ethnic voters [Birrell, 1995, p.3), but did not also possess the reductionist 
motivations associated with union-affiliation (Fraser, 1981, p.1-7; Lansbury, 1984, p.2). 
Indeed, if anything, Fraser’s government maintained a relationship with a business 
community whose support for immigration was much less elastic than organised labour’s 
opposition (Castles, 1992, p.57). Thus, whilst it is always difficult to disentangle and 
pinpoint the exact reasons behind executive decisions, a close reading of Figure Four does 
hint at potential partisan motivations. If the era’s Liberal Party supported larger programs, 
the evidence suggests that it was largely because of the parties’ different responses to rising 
unemployment, driven by their different relationships with labour.   
 
 
Figure Five: Permanent Migration and Unemployment from Fraser to Hawke-Keating 1979-1996 
 
Source: for migration, see: 1972-1996, Betts (1999), for employment: Treasury (2000).  
However, if we examine the next change of government, we can see that these motivations 
have not always defined the partisan dynamic (see: Figure Five). Unlike the previous 
transition, the literature comparing Fraser to the Hawke-Keating government features no 
single, predominant reading. Some, like Patience, have focussed on the initial contraction, 
whilst others, like Jupp and Collins, have emphasised the mid-term expansion in arrivals and 
the influence of the era’s economy (Patience, 1989, pp.419-420; Jupp, 2002, p.47; Collins, 
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1995, p.2). Whilst both analyses have merit (the program oscillated in size and the pieces all 
reflect certain, but not all, elements of Labor’s migratory record) the latter seems most 
relevant for this paper. Again, the most striking feature of the Labor administration’s 
migration program was the way that it responded to certain economic imperatives.  
As the previous section found, when unemployment has sat between 6.1% and 8.5%, the 
Labor Party’s proportionate intakes have been historically high. Within this particular 
labour market context, the ALP has promoted programs averaging 0.59% of population, 
whilst the Liberal Party’s average has been 0.45% (see: Table Three). In light of both 
Whitlam’s policies and the aforementioned theories of union behaviour, this result appears 
curious: instead of becoming increasingly prudent in times of relatively high unemployment, 
Labor has actually been quite expansionist. A close reading of Figure Three and Five 
suggests that the Hawke years were chiefly responsible for this partisan difference. From 
the mid-eighties until the decade’s end (which coincided with both a recession-driven, sharp 
increase in unemployment and the transfer of party leadership to Paul Keating) the Labor 
Party promoted comparatively large intakes alongside comparatively high levels of 
unemployment (Withers, 2002, p.11). Where Whitlam was highly sensitive to the labour 
market, the Hawke-Keating government was less concerned with responding to these 
pressures with heavily restrictionist policies. This evidence suggests that, next to Whitlam, 
the Hawke-Keating government was influenced by a fundamentally difference balance of 
migratory motivations.  
As with the earlier period, unions still broadly opposed large-scale immigration amidst high 
unemployment. This was especially the case for those migrants serving primarily economic 
functions (Tsokhas, 1994, p. 445). Indeed, according to Freeman and Birrell, the party’s 
initial hesitancy towards the program was largely ‘owing to trade union concerns over 
migrant worker competition in the labour market’ (2001, pp.532-33). However, less like 
Whitlam, and more like Fraser, Hawke actually went on to grow the program in the context 
of high unemployment and these associated union desires. At least in terms of the program’s 
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size, this implies that, compared to the 1972-75 government, the Labor Party’s motivational 
balance was more skewed towards certain expansionist imperatives. In particular, it 
especially points towards those imperatives less reactive to the labour market. Whilst it is 
difficult to disentangle multiculturalism’s political capital and ideological motivations (that 
is, those imperatives related to electoral concerns and those related to more pure, 
philosophical considerations) they both appear to have played important roles in the 
government’s migratory decisions.  
On one side, the Hawke-Keating government was deeply conscious of the ethnic bloc’s 
electoral weight (Betts, 2003, p.174). In response to the migrant lobby’s ‘vociferous 
criticisms’ of early migratory decisions, Borowski has argued that, towards the late 1980s, 
Labor became increasingly pliant to the electoral bloc’s demands, including their preference 
for more expansive programs (2000, p.467). Indeed, Peter Walsh, the administration’s one-
time Finance Minister, has acknowledged that policy was often made in order to avoid 
‘political backlash from ethnic leaders’ (1994, p.28). However, beyond these purely electoral 
concerns, the administration was also ideologically and rhetorically supportive of the 
multicultural project. Indeed, especially under Hawke, the party consistently advocated and 
defended migration’s role in Australia’s economic and cultural development (Mayne, 2009, 
p.100). Even in the context of 1988’s ‘Fitzgerald Report’ (which, in suggesting certain 
caveats, challenged more liberal definitions of the term) the government still strongly 
endorsed its ‘National Agenda for Multicultural Australia’ (Jupp, 1997, p.135). Whilst, again, 
assigning intent is an invariably imprecise process, the Hawke-Keating Labor government’s 
response to rising unemployment (in that it was not overtly restrictionist) implies a less 
labour-centric approach to the migration program’s size. Whilst more a matter of different 
balances than polar absolutes, the evidence suggests that, comparatively, the administration 
was more influenced by certain expansionist imperatives: in particular, it points to the 
importance of the less economically-elastic political capital and ideological motives relating 
to multiculturalism.   
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However, before going on, we should acknowledge a couple of caveats. The first is that, if the 
ALP was not as reactive to union concerns in terms of the program’s size, it does necessarily 
mean that it was totally unresponsive9. Indeed, as stated, the labour movement was 
particularly concerned with the influence of economic migrants (Tsokhas, 1994, p. 445). 
Because the migration program is comprised of the family reunion, skilled and special 
eligibility streams, it is plausible that, in terms of its internal composition, Labor was still 
conscious of union interests and favoured migrants without explicitly economic purposes. In 
fact, as will be examined later, this was largely the case (see: Chapter 3.3). The second 
qualifier is that, whilst the aforementioned trends were relatively representative, they still 
did not reflect the administration’s entire period of governance. In the early 1990s, when 
unemployment was particularly high (the era registered the largest joblessness rate in 
modern Australian history), the party did act to reduce the intake (see: Figure Five). 
Ultimately, these caveats point to both the limitations of focussing solely on ‘size’ and the 
problems associated with classifying an entire government in a clear numerical binary.  
 
Figure Six: Permanent Migration and Unemployment from Hawke-Keating to Howard, 1985-2007 
  
Source: for migration, see: 1972-1996, Betts (1999), for employment: Treasury (2000), ABS (2010).  
Figure Six graphs the migration program Howard inherited from Keating and the trajectory 
in which he guided it. In terms of this specific transition, most of the relevant literature has 
                                                          
9 After all, this was the time of the ‘Accords’ and a particularly close institutional relationship between 
Labor and the ACTU (ALP, & ACTU 1983; Kenyon an Lewis, 1992, p.325).  
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argued that the intake grew under the Liberal Party. As Higley et al have asserted, and has 
Betts has echoed, ‘during the Howard government’s long life, aggregate intakes rose’ (Higley 
et al, 2011, p.3; Betts, 2010, p.49). And, at face value, this was certainly true. That the 
program grew from 1996 to 2007 is both self-evident and irrefutable. However, for this 
paper, we need to ask a more interrogatory question: we need to ask whether this expansion 
was attributable to the Liberal Party’s unique partisan preferences.  
Whilst the program’s size grew steadily and consistently under Howard, it did so in the 
context of declining unemployment (see: Figure Six). Indeed, from 1996 to 2007, 
unemployment fell consistently (and, overall, substantially) from 8.6 to 4.5%. If we accept 
that policy decisions are framed by the state of the labour market (that is, that demand for 
labour can create different imperatives for governments [Simon, 1989: Breunig and Luedtke, 
2008, p.129]) then this expansion was not itself remarkable: theoretically, we would expect 
the migration program to grow alongside a strong jobs-market. For this paper, the pertinent 
question then becomes, not simply whether the program expanded, but whether the 
program expanded to a greater extent than other comparable periods.   
From 1997 to 2003, the unemployment rate fell from 8.3% to 6%. At the same time, the 
intake grew from 0.36% to 0.57% of population. Whilst this reflected an overall expansion 
from the end of the Hawke-Keating years, it was not necessarily an expansion from the times 
in which Labor experienced a similar labour market. Indeed, if we look back to the mid-to-
late 1980s, unemployment was of a very similar size and followed a very similar trajectory. 
In this particular context, the ALP also increased the program, but they actually did it to a 
greater extent than Howard: from 1984-1988, the program grew from 0.42% to 0.76% of 
population (see: Figure Six). In part, these comparable periods help to explain Table Three, 
which found that, when unemployment has sat between 6 and 8.5%, the Labor Party has 
promoted higher proportionate intakes than the Liberal Party (see: Chapter 2.2, ‘Table 
Three’). Ultimately, Howard only appears more expansionist than the Hawke-Keating 
government if we accept a misguided methodological premise: that is, that we should 
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compare years that are chronologically, rather than economically, similar. Indeed, if we take 
this into account, the opposite seems true. The governments’ overall average intakes were 
functionally the same (at 0.54% of population [Table One]), despite Labor experiencing 
labour markets far more conducive to restrictionist policies (on average, unemployment 
was 8.6% under Hawke-Keating and 6.2% under Howard).  
In terms of explaining partisan motivation, Figure Six does not provide a great deal of stark 
evidence. Across its eleven years, the Howard government responded to gradually falling 
unemployment as we would theoretically expect, albeit to a slightly less expansionist degree 
than earlier administrations. Because of this, unlike the other governments, it is unclear how 
it would have reacted to the different imperatives associated with rising unemployment. 
However, if we take a broader, contextual look at the administration, its behaviour can still 
be partially understood. Indeed, the era’s Liberal Party experienced a significant tension 
between certain expansionist and restrictionist imperatives: in particular, between its 
relationship with the business community and its uneasy approach to multiculturalism. On 
one hand, the Howard government maintained strong ties with industry (Cooper and Ellem, 
2008, pp.552-533). In terms of migration policy, this business community was vocally and 
consistently supportive of higher targets: as Betts has put it, it was an integral member of 
Australia’s ‘growth lobby’ (Betts, 2006, pp.40-52). And, as Betts has gone on to show, 
members of Cabinet were both conscious of these concerns and aware of their associated 
pressures (2006, p.49). On the other hand, Howard was notoriously mistrustful of 
multiculturalism (Johnson, 2002, p.178). When elected in 1996, he campaigned under the 
slogan of ‘For All of Us’, suggesting that, unlike the previous Labor government, it would not 
privilege minority interests, the ethnic community included, above other Australians (Ang 
and Stratton, 2006, p.24). And, in pre-executive statements, Howard even linked this 
scepticism with a normative approach to migration:  in 1988, he suggested that he ‘wouldn’t 
want to see it [the rate of Asian migration] greater than it already is’ (Tate, 2009, p.110). 
Whilst admittedly and inevitably speculative, the Howard government’s migration program 
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(which grew very gradually alongside a considerable fall in unemployment) can perhaps be 
read as a product of these competing impulses: as a balance between the expansionary 
desires of key supporters and its restrictionist aversion to multiculturalism.   
Figure Seven: Permanent Migration and Unemployment from Howard to Rudd-Gillard, 2000-2010.  
 
Source: for migration, see: 1972-1996, Betts (1999), for employment: Treasury (2000), ABS (2010).   
Finally, Figure Seven maps the most recent transfer of executive government. Whilst the 
period is short, and the Labor Party is continuing to formulate policy, there are still existing 
analyses of the transition. For instance, Stutchbury has argued that the government has 
overseen ‘the nation’s most rapid immigration expansion since the 1960s’ (2011, p.46). 
Birrell and Healey have made a similar assertion, arguing that the Rudd-Gillard government 
has ‘pursued a record high migration policy’ (2010, p.39). Whilst these points are technically 
correct (the early Rudd intakes were numerically, but not proportionately, higher than the 
early Whitlam years [see: Figure One]) they again assume that party decisions can be 
divorced from economic context. The Labor government’s migration programs may have 
been historically high, but, especially in its first year, it has governed amidst unemployment 
rates that have been historically low (see: Figure One). And, even then, the proportionate 
sizes of its intakes have been only slightly larger than those it inherited from Howard (see: 
Figure Seven), When attempting to understand Labor’s nascent behaviour, and also the 
reasons behind it, a more illuminating question is, not whether the Rudd-Gillard 
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government has been different to the entire Howard administration, but whether it has been 
different to the governments facing similar labour market contexts.  
Surprisingly, the most instructive of the available comparisons is also the most temporally 
disparate: in terms of the labour market, the most contextually similar period of governance 
was the actually under Whitlam (see: Figure One). If we compare the migration decisions of 
the two Labor governments, then the Rudd-Gillard administration’s approach to the 
program (and also the way that the ALP has changed) becomes clearer. Like Whitlam, Rudd 
was elected alongside relatively low unemployment and a relatively high permanent intake; 
like Whitlam, Rudd initially maintained this large program; and, like Whitlam, after this 
initial period, Rudd faced a spike in unemployment amidst economic insecurity (see: Figure 
One). What separated these governments, and what most highlights their differences, was 
their response to this changing labour market.  Where, as explained earlier, Whitlam cut the 
program drastically as unemployment rose (in 1975, the program was more than halved 
[Figure Four]) Rudd was much more prudent. The government did downwardly revise the 
program as the labour market worsened, but to a much smaller extent: instead of halving it, 
the previous year’s intake was reduced by less than 5%10 (MIAC, 2009; Figure Seven). 
Whilst still too early to make definitive statements, this behaviour places the government 
closer to the Hawke tradition, insofar as, whilst still conscious of economic pressures, the 
administration has been much less extreme in its sensitivity to rising unemployment. 
Ultimately, when experiencing a similar labour market to Whitlam, the Rudd-Gillard 
government has revised the intake, but to a much less drastic degree.  
 
When read as a whole, these transitions do not point to one coherent, overarching narrative 
about specific parties and the program’s size. At certain points, the Labor Party has 
expanded the program it inherited from the Liberal Party and, at other times, the opposite 
                                                          
10 This is slightly higher if we take into account government forecasts (against projections, the cuts were 
more like 10-15%). However, as this criterion has not been applied to other governments, it would be an 
inappropriate standard at which to judge this particular one (MIAC, 2009).  
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has occurred. As implicitly suggested throughout the section, this incoherence can be 
attributed to two primary causes. Firstly, the parties have governed in distinct economic 
contexts. As emphasised, because the state of the labour market has tended to frame 
migratory decisions, different administrations have responded to fundamentally different 
policy environments. This has meant that, across party history (see, for instance, Howard 
and Fraser’s distinct economic climates and their resulting decisions) neither has guided the 
program’s size in one single direction. Secondly, even acknowledging this, the major parties 
have often reacted differently to the same labour market conditions. Indeed, especially with 
the Labor governments, different administrations have responded distinctly to rising 
unemployment. As argued in the transitions’ analyses, this is a reflection of each 
administration’s unique motivational balance: it highlights the often competing impulses 
influencing both parties’ decisions and the different emphases placed by individual 
governments. Ultimately, largely because of these two reasons, the five governments have 
shaped the program in certain ways, but, when united, they have not done so in a single, 
coherent partisan direction.  
  
2.4. Conclusion 
Across its three sections, Chapter Two has examined whether the nation’s partisan clash has 
also reflected divergent approaches to the migration program’s size. To do this, it has used 
methods with two distinct scales: a longer-term, more macroscopic approach (sections 2.1 
and 2.2) and a more in-depth focus on specific governments and transitions (section 2.3). 
The latter, as just stated, did not find a consistent relationship between specific parties and 
the program’s size. Because of both economic contexts and transient motivations, 
governments representing both parties have not guided the program in a single, and 
certainly not coherent, direction. The former, however, did point to certain qualified inter-
party trends. If we control for unemployment and analyse the period as a whole (instead of 
separating the data into specific administrations) there is some evidence linking the Labor 
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Party with proportionately higher intakes.  Indeed, when unemployment has sat between 4 
and 8.5%, which constitutes the vast majority of examined years, Labor has promoted larger 
programs than their Liberal counterparts. However, even within these results, some caveats 
are necessary: the partisan difference was neither registered in all economic climates nor 
always tremendously large. Ultimately, taking into account both methods, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that, in certain economic contexts, there has been a soft relationship 
between the ALP and larger proportionate programs, but that such a link has not been 
coherently or consistently reflected in the behaviour of each of the period’s five 
governments.   
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Chapter III 
The Migration Program’s Composition, 1984-2010 
 
When examining the migration program, size is not the only significant partisan indicator: 
equally as important is how governments have used that size. Because the intake is a 
composite measurement (insofar as it is the sum of different ‘streams’) there has also been 
considerable room for inter-party distinction within the broad category of permanent 
migration. By focussing on the relative size of the program’s streams, this chapter will 
question whether either party has disproportionately promoted a certain ‘type’ of 
immigrant. 
In its totality, the migration program contains three streams, covering ‘skilled’, ‘family 
reunion’ and ‘special eligibility’ migrants (DoPS, 2010a, p.1). These streams are made up of 
different types of people, based on different governmental considerations. The two largest 
streams, and hence the two with the most potential to change the program’s compositional 
balance, are for ‘skilled’ and ‘family reunion’ migrants (DIAC, 2010, p.iv). On one hand, the 
skilled stream has an explicitly economic rationale. According to the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, the stream is designed to target ‘migrants who have skills or 
abilities that will contribute to the Australian economy’ (DIAC, 2011b). Whilst its specific 
dimensions have been dynamic (the targeted industries and requisite skills are somewhat 
malleable [DIAC, 2011d]), its overarching aim has remained distinctly material: that is, to 
meet shortages in the Australian labour market. On the other hand, the family reunion 
stream is not founded on nearly as economic a pillar. As its name suggests, its core aim is to 
reunite existing residents with their ‘partners’, ‘children’, ‘parents’ and ‘other family’. Unlike 
the skilled stream, those entering under this model are not forced to pass tests to prove 
their economic utility or aptitude in English (DIAC, 2011c). Because of both the relative 
dominance of these streams (as of 2010, they account for over 95% of Australia’s migration 
program [DIAC, 2010, p.iv]) and their conceptual differences (one being about Australia’s 
economic performance and the other being about meeting existing migrants’ cultural, 
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emotional and psychological needs) this chapter will use their relative sizes as a tool to 
determine whether different political parties have preferred different migrant compositions. 
Indeed, if we look at the existing literature on the question of partisanship and composition, 
most of it has also used this stream-based dichotomy as its evidential source (Patience, 1989; 
Betts, 2003; Higley et al, 2009).  
In terms of length, Chapter Three will analyse a slightly shorter period of time than Chapter 
Two. Where the latter examined the program’s size from 1972-2010, this chapter will study 
its composition from 1984-2010. This restriction is an unfortunate necessity, insofar as the 
comparable data only goes back to the mid-1980s. The government only began keeping 
reliable records on these streams (that is, skilled, family reunion and special eligibility) in 
1984-85 (DoPS, 2010b, p.10, and p.13). However, whilst this temporal limitation must be 
acknowledged (the evidence does not cover the entire post-White Australia era) the period 
still allows a relatively significant insight into the relationship between parties and 
composition: the period features a roughly even disaggregation of Labor and Liberal 
governance and still covers a quarter of a century of migration history.  
 
Echoing Chapter Two, Chapter Three will explore composition in three steps. Firstly, it will 
directly compare each year’s ‘composition ratio’ (that is, of the skilled stream against the 
family reunion stream) to the party in government. However, like Chapter Two, it will 
ultimately question the strength of such a blunt, variable-free measurement. Indeed, by 
adding the factor of unemployment, it will proceed to test this party behaviour in the 
context of Australia’s economic climate. This will analyse whether, when facing similar 
labour market pressures, there has been a partisan distinction in the program’s 
compositional balance. Finally, it will examine transitionary periods of government and ask 
whether a change in political party has tended to signal a change in composition. Like the 
previous chapter, by focussing on specific governments and their policy decisions, this final 
section will also examine the potential reasons behind any partisan difference.   
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3.1 The Composition Ratio and Political Parties 
Figure Eight maps the composition of Australia’s permanent migration program since 1984-
85. More specifically, it illustrates both the total annual intake and, within that measurement, 
the relative contribution of each stream. As an initial glance suggests, where the overall 
program has fluctuated, so too has the relationship between the family reunion and skilled 
streams. The program in 1994, which took in less than half a skilled migrant to every one 
family reunion migrant, was significantly different to 2008, which took in over two. A 
similarly initial assessment tells us that, over time, the historical trend has been towards a 
greater emphasis on skills. This becomes even more apparent when we map the progression 
of the skilled/family reunion ratio since 1984-85 (see: Figure Nine).   
 
Figure Eight: The Migration Program’s Composition: 1984-2010. 
 
Source: DoPS (2010a, p.13).  
 
Figure Nine illustrates the period’s ‘composition ratio’. This is an attempt to represent a 
government’s approach to the program’s internal composition. To get this figure, I have 
simply divided the relevant year’s skilled intake by its family reunion intake. Whilst the 
existing literature on composition has often used such a ratio implicitly (see: Patience, 1989; 
Betts, 2003), it has not often been formalised. For the purposes of this paper, such a 
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measurement is somewhat necessary, insofar as we require a standardised figure to 
compare temporally disparate administrations.  
 
Figure Nine: Ratio of Skilled Stream to Family Reunion Migrants, 1984-2010 
 
Source: DoPS (2010, p.13).  
 
Over this period, Bob Birrell has argued that Australia’s migration program has been 
increasingly driven by ‘labour market outcomes’. Indeed, he refers to them as the ‘key 
determinants’ of migration policy (2003, p.36). An analysis of Figure Nine does lend 
credence to his assertion. Especially since the mid-nineties, the skilled stream has 
progressively taken precedence over family reunion. However, for this paper, we have to ask 
a slightly more specific question: just how much of this trend can be attributed to the unique 
dispositions of the major parties? 
 
Table Four: Political Administrations and Average Skill/Family Reunion Stream Ratios 
Source: DoPS (2010, p.13).  
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Hawke/Keating, 
1984-96 (ALP) 
32, 167 58, 258 0.55 0.23-0.81 
Howard, 1996-07 
(Liberal Party) 
58, 293 39, 237 1.48 0.62-2.15 
Rudd/Gillard, 2007-
11 (ALP) 
110,539 55, 259 2.00 1.82-2.18 
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Table Five: Political Parties and Average Skill/Family Reunion Stream Ratios. 
Source: DoPS (2010, p.13).  
 
Table Four averages out the three administrations’ compositional ratios; Table Five does the 
same thing, but, instead of focussing on administrations, it conflates the results along party 
lines. In terms of partisan distinction, these tables do present a degree of affirmative 
evidence. Like Chapter One’s hypothesis (that is, that the Liberal Party might prefer more 
skilled-focussed intakes) Table Five implies a relationship between specific governments 
and the program’s composition. If we compare the Hawke-Keating and Howard 
administrations, which actually account for over four-fifths of our data-set, it is clear that the 
Liberal administration promoted considerably more skilled-centric programs. Reflecting the 
period’s trend-line, Australia’s compositional ratio averaged 0.55 during former’s reign, 
whilst latter averaged a substantially higher 1.48: indeed, the Liberal government more than 
doubled the ratio of their Labor predecessor (see: Table Four). And with an overall mean of 
1.10 and a standard deviation of 0.64, the two administrations’ compositional ratios were 
significantly divergent. As Betts has argued, the Howard government appeared to ‘sharpen 
the program’s economic focus and reduce the size of its family-reunion component’ (2003, 
p.169).  
If we take a step back to Table Five’s more blunt inter-party measurement (that is, to the 
average ratio across each party’s total time in office), then this conclusion is, albeit to a less 
drastic degree, reinforced. As the table suggests, in their accumulative years in government 
since the data became available, the Labor Party has averaged a compositional ratio of 0.83 
and the Liberal Party has averaged one of 1.48. This measurement tells us that, over the 
entirety of our data-set, the Liberal Party has sponsored programs that have, to greater 
extent than Labor, disproportionately emphasised permanent migration’s more economic 
Party  Average Skill Stream Average Family 
Reunion Stream 
Average Ratio 
ALP 51, 258 61, 777 0.83 
Liberal Party 58, 293 39, 237 1.48 
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functions. Thus, if we interpret this particular evidence (alongside the Hawke-Keating and 
Howard comparison) in an immediate sense, and ignore the potential influence of context, 
then Chapter One’s hypothesis appears to be true: comparatively, the Liberal Party seems to 
have particularly preferred the skilled stream. The Betts narrative, of a Liberal government 
more concerned with economic migration, appears to contain a certain grain of truth. 
However, like the analysis of the program’s size, these tables also contain evidence which 
complicate this picture, implying that there are other variables that have influenced this 
compositional change. 
 
If political parties were the sole dictators of the intake’s composition, and the Coalition had a 
greater intrinsic disposition towards skilled-based immigration, there are certain things 
which are unlikely to be observed. The first is a Labor government possessing the highest 
average composition ratio. However, as Table Four shows, this has been exactly the case 
with the party’s most recent, Rudd-Gillard administration. Since its election in late 2007, 
Australia has averaged two skilled stream migrants to each new family reunion arrival, a 
reasonably higher mean than the Howard government’s 1.48. Furthermore, the peak of the 
compositional ratio, at 2.18 in 2008, was also registered under Rudd. In fact, it was 
projected to be even higher, if not for financial crisis-driven insecurity and their associated 
labour-market strains: the skilled stream was revised down by the Labor government in the 
context of the GFC’s economic uncertainty (The Age, 2009). As Birrell and Healey have put it, 
the Rudd-Gillard administration has seemed to ‘privilege the delivery of migrant skills over 
all other factors in setting immigration policy’ (2010, p.40). Ultimately, rejecting the 
hypothesis that the Labor Party has consistently emphasised the program’s family reunion 
stream, the latest ALP government’s approach to composition has been fundamentally 
different to the Hawke-Keating years.  
On top of this, if we look at intra-government fluctuation, then the notion that party 
autonomy has not been the sole determinant of migratory composition is reinforced. For 
instance, in the Hawke-Keating years, the skilled-to-family reunion ratio oscillated from 0.23 
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to 0.81. Indeed, within their period of party government, the program’s composition both 
rose and fell a number of times. Under Howard, the composition also experienced similar 
magnitudes of variation (Table Five; Figure Nine). Like the analysis of size, these internal 
ranges suggest that the composition has not been solely the product of the major parties 
stable dispositions: because the composition has often varied drastically within 
governments, migratory decisions have evidently been influenced by more than the parties’ 
constant policy preferences. This does not automatically disprove a link between political 
parties and migrant composition, but it certainly implies a meaningful flaw in their 
immediate causal connection. Like Chapter Two, these points suggest that such a simplistic 
interpretation of the data is misguided: that, in order to genuinely understand the 
phenomena’s relationship, we must account for the other variables guiding policy. As 
Chapter Two argued, the most important external variable framing the program’s size has 
been the labour market. If we also examine its relationship with composition, it becomes 
clear that the state of unemployment has enjoyed a similarly significant influence over the 
program’s internal balance.   
 
3.2 The Economy, Composition Ratio and Political Parties 
As much of the conventional theory surrounding migration policy argues, periods of 
economic expansion tend to stimulate demand for migrant labour. Because migration adds 
to a nation’s labour pool, it is often used to fill holes in a tight jobs-market (Simon, 1989; 
Breunig and Luedtke, 2008, p.129; Chapter 2.2). Whilst these conditions have historically 
influenced the migration program’s overall size, they have also shaped its internal 
composition. As the skilled stream is Australia’s main source of permanent economic 
migration (DIAC, 2011b), periods of high unemployment (whereby, as argued, the demand 
for migrant labour is diminished) disproportionately reduce the demand for the stream. In 
other words, because, more so than with family reunion, the skilled stream’s raison d’etre is 
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fundamentally tied to the labour market, their relative sizes cannot be divorced from the 
economic contexts that frame policy. 
This was certainly true of Australia’s most recent period of economic insecurity.  In 2009, 
when Chris Evans revised the migration program because of the ‘economic pressures’ 
associated with the ‘global financial crisis’, skilled migration was the only stream targeted:  
18,500 spots were cut, a 14% reduction in the forecasted intake (MOI, 2009). In fact, this 
decision reflected a broader international trend, with the world registering an overall drop 
in the number of economic migrants going to major immigrant-receiving nations (Fix et al, 
2009, p.1). According to Fix et al, when confronted with this recession, governments across 
the globe embraced policies aiming to ‘restrict [migrant] access to their labour markets’ 
(2009, pp.5-6). If we look at Australia’s longer-term history of both composition and 
employment, then this relationship becomes even clearer. 
 
Figure Ten: Australia’s Unemployment Rate and Composition Ratio, 1984-2010.  
 
Source: For migration, see: APH (2010, p.13) and for unemployment, see: Treasury (2010) and ABS (2010).  
 
Figure Ten maps Australia’s unemployment rate against its composition ratio. As the trend-
lines suggest, there has been, at the very least, a striking correlation between the two 
indicators. As the unemployment rate has risen, the ratio of skilled to family reunion arrivals 
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have tended to fall. Conversely, low unemployment rates have been conducive to relatively 
high skilled streams. However, whilst the relationship is certainly strong, it does not 
completely rule out a link between specific parties and different compositions. Indeed, as 
the two lines are not completely inverted (there are certain points at which the ratio has not 
directly reacted to unemployment), the graph concedes the possibility of further causal 
agents. This section will control for this variable and determine whether, within the same 
economic brackets, either party has behaved differently. 
Table six: Political Parties, Unemployment and Average Composition Ratios, 1984-2010 
4-6.5% Average Range 
ALP 1.69 0.7 – 2.18 
Liberal Party 1.72 1.34 – 2.15 
 
6.6-8.5% Average Range 
ALP 0.49 0.23 – 0.8 
Liberal Party 0.98 0.62 – 1.11 
 
8.6< Average Range 
ALP 0.57 0.42 – 0.81 
Liberal Party N/A N/A 
Source: Migration: DoPS (2010, p.13) and for unemployment, see: Treasury (2010) and ABS (2010). 
 
Table Six shows how both parties have reacted to similar economic climates. Like Chapter 
Two, it sorts the available data into groups based on each year’s unemployment rate and 
party in office. Concededly, because of the smaller amount of available evidence, it does have 
comparative limitations: the economic brackets are slightly larger, but, with twenty-six 
years with which to work, longer groupings are somewhat necessary. 
If we look at the table, unemployment’s historical relationship with composition is apparent. 
The overwhelming tendency in both parties has been to endorse skills amidst a stronger 
jobs-market. However, beyond this, it also contains some important evidence supporting the 
notion that the Liberal Party has been particularly aggressive in promoting the skilled 
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stream. When unemployment has sat between 6.6 and 8.5% (which constitutes over half of 
the period’s data) the Liberal Party’s average ratio has been considerably higher than the 
Labor Party’s. In this bracket, the Howard government promoted ratios with an average of 
0.98, a relatively even balance between the two streams. Within the same labour market 
context, the ALP’s average ratio was 0.49, only half that of the Liberal Party’s (see: Table 
Six). This means that, when faced with these broadly similar economic imperatives, the 
Liberal Party has been more skills-focussed than Labor. And, with a mean of 0.69 and a 
standard deviation of 0.34, this partisan gap has also been a meaningful one.  
However, again, not all evidence supports the one, coherent conclusion. In periods of greater 
economic security and a tighter jobs-market, the Labor Party has not appeared to 
disproportionately support the family reunion stream. In fact, when unemployment has sat 
between 4% and 6.5%, the major parties’ behaviour has been almost identical. In this 
bracket, the ALP and Liberal Party have promoted respective composition ratios of 1.69 and 
1.72 (see: Table Six). Thus, like the broader analysis of the migration program’s size, our 
measurements do not cohere to a single narrative. When unemployment has been low, 
parties have acted similarly, but when unemployment has risen, the Liberal Party’s 
programs have been comparatively more weighted towards the skilled stream. Ultimately, 
the two contexts have provided fundamentally different results.  
If we are to make conclusions based on this evidence, then, we necessarily have to be more 
nuanced. Table Six suggests that, in different labour market climates, the two parties’ 
approaches to composition have historically diverged. That is, that when unemployment has 
been low, there has been a partisan consensus over disproportionately supporting the 
skilled stream. Insofar as one has existed, the partisan distinction has instead stemmed from 
the opposite economic pole: it arisen out of insecurity and higher unemployment. Indeed, 
amidst a weaker jobs-market, our evidence suggests that Labor has been considerably more 
reluctant than the Liberal Party to promote skilled migrants (see: Table Six). Whilst the next 
section will explore the potential reasons behind these results (and also some of their 
Political Parties and Australia’s Migration Program Shaun Crowe 
 
63 | P a g e  
 
limitations) our measurements do imply a qualified relationship between parties and 
composition: when unemployment has been moderately high, and not comparatively low, 
the Liberal Party has been significantly more skilled-centric than Labor.  
 
3.3. Transitionary Periods of Governance: Composition and Potential Motivators 
As argued in Chapter Two, the aforementioned method (which provides an overview of 
compositional history) has only a limited capacity to illuminate both the specifics of 
governmental decisions and the reasons behind them. Accordingly, this section will more 
closely examine the relationship between consecutive governments and their migration 
programs. By doing this, it will, like Chapter Two, analyse two main things. Firstly, it will 
study whether successive administrations, representing different political parties, have 
promoted different compositional policies. Secondly, it will examine how these migratory 
decisions have reflected the intricate motivations of party behaviour. Across both of these 
questions, the section will argue that the transitions reveal an uneven relationship between 
the Liberal Party and skilled migration; moreover, it will argue that this has primarily 
stemmed from different historical relationships with both unions and migrant communities. 
However, it will also acknowledge that, because of certain features and restrictions within 
the available evidence, these conclusions are necessarily limited.  
Figure Ten: Unemployment and Composition Ratio from Hawke-Keating to Howard, 1984-2007 
 
Source: For migration, see: DoPS (2010, p.13) and for unemployment, see: Treasury (2010) and ABS (2010).  
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Figure Ten maps the composition’s trajectory from Hawke-Keating to Howard. When 
examining this transition, most of the relevant literature has asserted a link between the 
Liberal Party and more skills-intensive migration. For instance, Betts has argued that the 
program’s economic focus was ‘sharpened’ by Howard (2003, p.169). Both Higley and 
Collins have made similar observations (Higley et al, 2011, p.3; Collins, 2008, p.254). And, as 
Figure Ten suggests, these contentions have certainly appeared true: the program’s skilled-
to-family reunion ratio rose consistently under the Liberal government. From the 
composition it inherited (at 0.43), to the end of its term (at 1.96), the program was 
increasingly skewed towards economic migration. However, we should not necessarily 
assume that changes that occurred under a government were completely because of that 
government. Indeed, these compositional trends also existed alongside a broadly falling rate 
of unemployment (see: Figure Ten). If, as argued earlier, party decisions are framed by the 
state of the labour market, then these changes are not themselves proof of a relationship 
between parties and composition. They could also be a product of the increased need for 
skilled workers associated with changing labour conditions. To ascertain the distinction 
between Hawke-Keating and Howard, we instead have to ask whether the parties have 
reacted uniquely to the same external environment.  
As analysed in Chapter Two, from the mid-1980s until the decade’s end, Australia’s 
unemployment rate fell from just above 8% to around 6%; from 1996 to 2003, the labour 
market experienced a trend of a similar size and trajectory. These mirror environments 
provide a lens in which to compare the two governments’ policies. In this context of 
relatively high, but falling, unemployment, Hawke’s Labor Party did expand the program’s 
proportion of skilled migrants: from 1985 to 1990, the ratio rose from 0.23 to 0.80. In 
Howard’s equivalent period of governance, the Liberal Party also grew the percentage of 
skilled arrivals. However, significantly, the administration did so to a much greater extent 
than Labor did: in this labour market context, the programs’ ratio grew from 0.43 to 1.62 
(see: Figure Ten). Indeed, this helps to explain Table Six, which found that, when 
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unemployment has sat between 6.6 and 8.5%, the Liberal Party has been considerably more 
aggressive in promoting skills. And, in terms of this particular transition, it also helps to 
explain why the Howard government was, as Betts, HIgley and Collins have argued, 
genuinely more skills-focussed than its predecessor: whilst both administrations grew the 
ratio in this shared context, Howard did so to a far greater degree than Hawke-Keating.  
 
When attempting to understand why the administrations behaved differently, these results 
also illuminate certain motivational disparities. Firstly, the distinction suggests that we 
should reconsider our earlier assessment of Hawke-Keating’s relationship with trade unions. 
Indeed, just because the government’s intakes were comparatively high, does not 
necessarily mean that it altogether ignored the interests of organised labour. As stated 
earlier, in this particular period, the union movement was specifically concerned with 
economic migration (Tsokhas, 1994, p. 445). And, as Birrell has argued, this makes 
theoretical sense, insofar as (considering their general interests in minimising the intake 
and how they are exacerbated by high unemployment [Freeman, 1997, p.47; Haus, 1999, 
p.683]) broader union reservations with migration are only intensified by the skilled stream: 
that is, the concerns over labour market outcomes are amplified when the arrivals are 
explicitly designed to enter that market (Birrell, 1984, p.72). For proof of these concerns, 
and to also illustrate how the era’s Labor Party was conscious of them, we only need to look 
at 1983’s initial ‘Prices and Incomes Accord’. The first ‘Accord’, the formal agreement 
between the ALP and ACTU, explicitly stated that ‘the family reunion [stream] and refugee 
intakes are of the highest priority’ (ALP and ACTU, 1983). Indeed, when explaining the 
reasons behind the period’s partisan distinction, this relationship (and its Liberal 
equivalent), seems crucial. Where the Labor Party had a formal agreement with the ACTU 
favouring the family reunion stream, the Liberal Party maintained the opposite: under 
Howard, the Liberal Party preserved a relationship with a business community whose 
support for migration was especially weighted towards commercially useful skills (Betts, 
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2006, p.42). Thus, at least in part, the parties’ different compositional balances reflected 
their different associations with economic organisations. 
However, when explaining this distinction, these union and business affiliations tell only half 
of the story. Also significant were the governments’ different relationships with actual 
migrant communities. Under Hawke, Labor (partially driven by its enthusiasm for 
multiculturalism and partially driven by more political concerns) fostered close ties with 
ethnic groups (Grattan, 1993, p.137; Betts, 2003, pp. 171-76). Whilst broadly supportive of 
expanded migration, these groups tended to be, for obvious reasons, particularly in favour 
of those spots relating to family reunion (Betts, 2003, p.171). And, in conjunction with the 
aforementioned union ties, the period’s Labor Party was highly sensitive to these concerns 
(Birrell, 1992, p.36). As Peter Walsh has acknowledged, executive policy was conscious of 
outside pressure groups and specifically endeavoured to avoid the ‘backlash of ethnic 
leaders’ (Walsh, 1994, p.28).  
Conversely, to the extent that this relationship existed, John Howard attempted to define 
himself in rhetorical opposition to such associations. As alluded to earlier, when elected, he 
distanced himself from the allegedly ‘noisy’ interests that, according to the Liberal Party, 
had come to dominate Australia’s decision making (Sawer, 2004, p.8). Indeed, both the 
migrant lobby and the related ‘multiculturalists’ were cited examples of the supposedly 
symbiotic and corrupting link between minority groups and public policy (Brett, 2003, p.79). 
Alongside the party’s different relationships with economic organisations, these ties also 
help to explain why the administrations embraced distinct compositional policies: the two 
governments maintained different practical and rhetorical associations with a demographic 
whose preferences were especially met by family reunion. Significantly, unlike Chapter 
Two’s analysis of ‘size’, these dominant partisan motivations (that is, those relating to 
economic and ethnic ties) actually aligned. Instead of competing, the transition’s two 
primary imperatives pushed the Labor Party towards family reunion and the Liberal Party 
towards skills.  
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However, before going on, this trend requires one specific and important caveat. Whilst 
partisan factors certainly influenced the era’s composition, so too did definitional changes.  
Early in its term, the Howard government redefined who exactly qualified for each of the 
program’s streams. Specifically, by adding a ‘points-test’ and basic language requirements, 
the ‘concessional’ category was renamed ‘Skilled Australian Linked’ and reclassified (DIAC, 
2000; ABS, 2007). This moved certain migrants that previously would have been classed as 
family reunion into the skilled stream. Because this happened concurrently with the change 
of government, it has to also be considered, alongside partisan factors, as a contributing 
cause behind the ascension of skilled migration. Ultimately, whilst parties were themselves 
important, we cannot ignore the impact of internal redefinition.  
 
Figure Eleven: Unemployment and Composition Ratio from Howard to Rudd-Gillard, 1997-2010
 
Source: For migration, see: DoPS (2010, p.13) and for unemployment, see: Treasury (2010) and ABS (2010)  
Figure Eleven maps composition amidst the most recent partisan transition. When 
examining the move from Howard to Rudd-Gillard, Birrell & Healey have argued that Labor 
has continued to ‘privilege the delivery of skills’ (2010, p.40). Indeed, unlike the previous 
period, this transition has not seemed to coincide with an overly meaningful change in the 
program’s composition. Whilst Labor has marginally reduced the percentage of skilled 
migrants, it has done so in the context of rising unemployment (MIAC, 2009). In fact, looking 
critically at Figure Eleven, the ALP’s ratio is of a roughly similar size to what it was when the 
Liberal Party faced an analogous level of unemployment. This comparable behaviour 
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explains the other half of Table Six, which found that, when unemployment has sat between 
4 and 6.5%, the two parties have supported almost inseparable average compositions. 
Contrary to when unemployment has been moderately high, the late Howard and early 
Rudd-Gillard years have reflected very little partisan distinction.   
When attempting to explain these results, we have two options. However, with the specific 
years and evidence available to us, both are difficult to prove and both point to the data-set’s 
specific limitations. The first explanation is that, like with size, the imperatives driving the 
Labor Party have been economically elastic: that is, they have been felt more intensely when 
unemployment has been high. This argument specifically concerns the labour movement. As 
Haus has suggested, union concerns over labour outcomes theoretically heighten as the 
jobs-market becomes more competitive (Haus, 1999, p.683). And, in terms of Australia’s 
composition, these trade unions concerns have related particularly to the skilled stream 
(ACTU & ACTU, 1983). Whilst, in the Rudd-Gillard years, major unions still supported cuts to 
the skilled intake amidst GFC-driven insecurity, this potential explanation implies that such 
desires were not as strong as they were in other contexts (SMH, 2009; Herald Sun, 2009): 
because the ALP acted on a scale similar to the Liberal Party, it implies that, in a relative 
sense, the resonance of labour’s demands were weaker than the times when unemployment 
has been at a higher rate. 
The other possible interpretation involves the nature of the Labor Party. If Rudd-Gillard’s 
compositions have differed with Hawke-Keating’s, it might not necessarily be because of the 
inherent elasticity of interest groups and the consequent vocality of their desires: it could 
also be based on changes in the way that the ALP has received them. In other words, the 
Rudd-Gillard government could be less receptive to unions and migrant groups than the 
earlier Labor administration. Indeed, especially under Rudd, certain commentators have 
observed a changing, if not weakening, tie between the labour movement and ALP policy 
(Cook, 2010, p.5-7; Hall, 2008, p.32). However, based on the available evidence, both of 
these explanations are very difficult to prove. The years at our disposal do not show how 
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Labor would have responded to the labour market conditions experienced by Hawke-
Keating (DoPS, 2010b, p.10 and 13; Figure Eleven). As a result, it is hard to ascertain 
whether Rudd-Gillard’s early behaviour was representative of an intrinsic change in Labor’s 
disposition (that is, that it was generally less reactive to union and ethnic concerns) or the 
elastic nature of partisan motivation: it is difficult to tell, and both theories implicitly 
speculate, whether the party would have reacted to higher unemployment based on the 
earlier partisan trends or remained more aligned with era’s Liberal policy. Indeed, because 
of this, any attempt to build a coherent theory about parties, unemployment and 
composition is necessarily limited by information. Therefore, across the twenty-six years, 
the period’s transitions registered a relationship between the Liberal Party and skilled 
migration, but not that was reflected consistently; the compositional change from Hawke-
Keating to Howard was not replicated in the transition from Howard to Rudd-Gillard.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
As argued, this chapter has found a specific relationship between parties and composition. 
Rather than being represented across all years, this partisan distinction has been confined to 
certain economic contexts. As Table Six found, when unemployment has been higher 
(between 6.5-8.5%) the Liberal Party has been more aggressive in promoting skills. 
Conversely, when unemployment has been lower (between 4-6.5%) no great distinction has 
been registered: in fact, the parties have behaved in relative accordance.  
However, due to certain features and restrictions within the available data, building an 
overarching explanation of these results is difficult. As the more in-depth analysis of 
partisan transitions showed, because the available years do not show how modern Labor 
would have reacted to higher unemployment, it is hard to tell whether this inconsistency 
was based on the economically-elastic influence of unions or changes within the actual party. 
Ultimately, this points to the limitations within the available evidence and the associated 
problems with creating a coherent theory about parties, employment and composition.   
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Conclusion 
Implicitly, this thesis has been premised on a certain conception of structure and agency. In 
terms of both size and composition, it has acknowledged that structure (in this case, the 
labour market) has significantly influenced executive decisions. Indeed, as suggested, 
different states of unemployment have created very different migratory imperatives (see: 
Chapter 2.2 and Chapter 3.2). However, whilst accepting this, it has also argued that agency 
(that is, the conscious decisions of partisan actors) has continued to exist within these 
structures: ultimately, parties have still enjoyed the autonomy to react to these labour 
markets in their own unique ways, based on their own unique preferences.  
Therefore, in order to determine the existence of any historical inter-party distinction 
(which, in essence, amounts to the difference between the two parties’ agencies) this thesis 
has attempted to control for the dominant structure. In practice, this has meant only 
comparing partisan decisions made in similar labour markets.   
 
Chapter Two applied this reasoning to the issue of size. This examined whether, since White 
Australia’s abolition, either party’s permanent intakes have been disproportionately high. 
By sorting each year’s migration program into groups based on the unemployment rate and 
the party in office, the chapter’s longer-term analysis did find a certain, albeit qualified, 
relationship between partisanship and size (see: Chapter 2.2). When unemployment has sat 
between both 4-6% and 6.1-8.5%, which accounts for over three quarters of the analysed 
period, the Labor Party has promoted more expansive average programs than the Liberal 
Party. In terms of thesis’ question, this presented a degree of positive evidence: it meant that, 
in these shared contexts of moderately low to moderately high unemployment, Labor 
governance has actually tended to correlate with larger intakes (see: Table Three). However, 
even within these measurements, such a conclusion has possessed significant limitations 
and required important caveats. Firstly, contrary to these aforementioned trends, the 
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partisan difference has not been registered in every context. When unemployment has 
transcended 8.5%, the Liberal Party has instead been more expansive. Secondly, even in the 
brackets where the distinction has been found, the inter-party gap has not always been 
tremendously large (see: Table Three).  
Moreover, when the chapter focussed on specific governments and their policies, it found 
further evidence of inconsistency (see: Chapter 2.3). Across the five governments, there has 
not been a coherent relationship between the major parties and the program’s trajectory: at 
certain points, Labor expanded the program it inherited from the Liberal Party and, at other 
points, the opposite occurred. As argued, this was largely because of two things. Firstly, 
administrations governed in unique economic contexts. Because the labour market has 
tended to frame policy decisions, different governments have reacted to fundamentally 
different policy environments. Secondly, even accepting this, the two parties have often 
responded distinctly to the same labour market. Influenced by the often competing 
motivations driving partisan policy, individual governments have reacted inconsistently to 
rising unemployment (see: Chapters 1.3 and 2.3). Taking both these approaches into 
account, the chapter ultimately concluded that, in certain economic contexts, there has been 
soft relationship between the ALP and larger proportionate programs, but that such a link 
had not been coherently or consistently reflected in the behaviour of each of the period’s 
five governments.   
 
Chapter Three applied a similar logic and method, but this time to composition. Analysing a 
shorter period of time (that is, from 1984 to 2010) it examined whether either party has 
disproportionately supported the skilled or family reunion streams. In its overview of 
composition, unemployment and parties, the chapter did uncover a noteworthy inter-party 
trend (see: Chapter 3.2; Table Six). However, instead of being represented across all its 
evidence, this partisan difference was disaggregated along economic lines. When 
unemployment has been comparatively low (sitting between 4-6.5%) the two parties have 
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behaved in relative unison. However, when unemployment has been moderately high 
(sitting between 6.5-8.5%) there has been a clear historical difference. In this labour market, 
the Liberal Party has been considerably more aggressive than the Labor Party in promoting 
skills and minimising family reunion. 
This inconsistency was again found in the chapter’s more in-depth focus on specific 
governments. On one hand, when executive power was transferred from Hawke-Keating to 
Howard, the program’s percentage of skilled migrants increased noticeably. Even 
controlling for the era’s falling unemployment rate, the Liberal Party still expanded the 
skilled/family reunion ratio to a much greater extent than Labor did. On the other hand, 
when Rudd-Gillard was elected to office after Howard, no great change ensued.  In the 
context of the era’s labour market, the two administrations possessed very similar 
compositional policies. Ultimately, as argued in the chapter, attempting to coherently 
explain this inconsistency is an empirically difficult task. Because the available years do not 
show how Rudd-Gillard’s Labor would have reacted to higher unemployment, it is hard to 
tell whether the disparities between the results (that is, between high & low unemployment 
and Hawke-Keating & Rudd-Gillard governance) were based on the elastic influence of 
unions or internal, historical changes within the political party. Of course, in reality, the 
truth could sit somewhere between these two poles. 
 
Therefore, across both its sub-questions, this thesis has found specific, albeit heavily 
qualified, relationships between the major parties and migration outcomes. Ultimately, 
these are the contexts and traditions in which cotemporary political rhetoric (for instance, 
2010’s cross-party suggestion that partisan decisions would dictate Australia’s migration 
policy) should be read. Not because they predict the future, but because, by examining the 
past, they help to explain the ways in which parties have historically shaped permanent 
migration policy and the reasons why they have acted as they have.   
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